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Abstract. We assess the potential damage and smoke
production associated with the detonation of small nuclear
weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear
warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three
since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states
is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional
nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nu-
clear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32
nations already have the fissile material needed to build sub-
stantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives.
Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated
to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be tar-
geted in a nuclear conflict. We find that low yield weapons,
which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can pro-
duce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much
smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in anal-
yses for full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons,
if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single
“small” nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to
more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than
have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many coun-
tries. We analyze the likely outcome of a regional nuclear
exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of
the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal).
We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatal-
ities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War
II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear
war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to at-
mospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely
be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and interna-
tional implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from ur-
ban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper
troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007)
show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the
Correspondence to: O. B. Toon
(toon@lasp.colorado.edu)
stratosphere due to atmospheric heating, and then might in-
duce significant climatic anomalies on global scales. We also
anticipate substantial perturbations of global ozone. While
there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here,
the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that
might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards identified
pose a significant threat to the global community. They de-
serve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by
a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as
widespread public debate.
1 Introduction
In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a
nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked interna-
tional scientific and political debate, and deep public con-
cern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock
et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts
could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels
contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and
improvements in relationships between the major nuclear
powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single
nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the
first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences
of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the
emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) ex-
plore the climate changes that might occur due to the smoke
emissions from such a conflict.
The results of this study show that the potential effects
of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the
weapons used over Japan during the Second World War
(WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At
least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation
of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears
to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspi-
ciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor
Published by Copernicus GmbH on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
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Fig. 1. (top): Number of nuclear warheads in Russia (USSR), the
U.S. and the total for all the Nuclear Weapons States (Norris and
Kristensen, 2002). (About 10 000 Russian warheads of indetermi-
nate status were omitted ). Russia and the U.S. have more than
95% of the warheads worldwide. The number of warheads began
to fall after 1986 following the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, and by 2002 was about one-third of its value at the peak in
1986. Current treaties do not require a future reduction in the num-
bers of warheads, only a reduction in the numbers of warheads that
are on strategic delivery systems. (bottom): The arsenals of China,
France and Britain have also remained stable or declined in the past
two decades. Note the factor of about 100 change in scale between
(top) and (bottom).
to weapons construction. Thirty-two other countries that do
not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable
nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively
short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict
involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explo-
sive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause
casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude,
their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the
casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strate-
gic war between the superpowers involving thousands of
weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield.
Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts
would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and
effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were at-
tacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of
local radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously
inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited
by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons
used against city centers would produce global climate dis-
turbances unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock
et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the thou-
sands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or
injure a million people in a terrorist attack.
Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and po-
tential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due
to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on
a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next
we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of
such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then
discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we
describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a
regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections
we outline the associated uncertainties.
We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this
analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans
of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear ar-
senals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy
nuclear weapons. There are obviously many possible path-
ways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning
the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly
improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters
requires that a range of plausible scenarios be considered,
given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of
regional conflict. In the present analysis, we adopt two po-
tential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated
in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear ex-
change between two newly minted nuclear weapons states
involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We
do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that
most citizens and politicians today are aware of the potential
disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or
a Indian-Pakistani territorial confrontation. Moreover, as nu-
clear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates,
the possible number and combinations of flash points mul-
tiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed
here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the idea
that such scenarios as we propose are executable.
2 Nuclear arsenals
Table 1 lists the world’s known nuclear arsenals. Five coun-
tries were recognized as Nuclear Weapons States in the 1968
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: France,
People’s Republic of China, Russia (formerly USSR), United
Kingdom and the United States. There are about 30 000 nu-
clear warheads worldwide, 95% being held by Russia and the
U.S. There is enough refined and unrefined nuclear explosive
material in the world to construct another 100 000 weapons
(National Academy of Sciences, 2005). No state has revealed
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Table 1. Nuclear weapons inventories.
Country India Pakistan Israel China France Britain U.S. Russia
Date of analysis 2003 2003 2003 2003 2005 2005 2005 2005
Total # warheads 85(65–110)a 52(44–62)a 116(102–130)a 400b 350c < 200d 5315e 7200f
# detonatedg 2–5 2–6 45 210 45 1030 715
# atmospheric testsg 23 50 21 215 219
a To compute the numbers of weapons for India, Pakistan and Israel, we used the Pu and HEU estimates of Albright et al. (1997) for 2003.
We assumed each weapon contained 5 kg Pu or 25 kg of HEU. Parentheses indicate 5% and 95% confidence limits on Pu or HEU.
b Norris and Kristensen (2003). 280 of these are strategic weapons.
c Norris and Kristensen (2005c).
d Norris and Kristensen (2005e).
e Norris and Kristensen (2005f). 4535 of these warheads are for strategic weapons. There are also 5000 intact warheads in reserve or in
inactive stockpiles.
f Norris and Kristensen (2005a). 3814 of these are strategic warheads. Another 9000 intact warheads are in reserve or inactive stockpiles.
g Norris and Arkin (1998).
the precise number of warheads in its stockpile (National
Academy of Sciences, 2005). However, the strategic arsenals
of Britain, France, Russia, and the U.S. can be reasonably
estimated from treaties that verifiably limit the number and
capacity of delivery systems. The U.S. and Russia also have
significant stockpiles of strategic warheads in reserve, or in
storage, beyond those devoted to current strategic delivery
systems. The numbers of tactical weapons, including mines,
artillery shells, depth charges, and bombs are more uncer-
tain; for example, the Russian tactical stockpile is known
only to within 5000 devices (National Academy of Sciences,
2005). Figure 1 plots the trends of nuclear warheads (exclud-
ing about 10 000 of indeterminate status in Russia for 2002)
during the past several decades. As may be seen the numbers
of warheads has declined by roughly a factor of 3 in the past
two decades.
There are currently three De Facto nuclear weapons states,
which have developed weapons outside of the restrictions of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Israel, and Pak-
istan. The arsenals of India, Israel and Pakistan (as well as
China) are not well documented. The numbers of warheads
they control was determined by several researchers by first
estimating the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
of plutonium that could have been produced by each country
and allocated to military uses, as opposed to civilian appli-
cations. An assumption is then made regarding the amounts
of fissionable material needed for each warhead. While all
of the available material in military hands may not be assem-
bled into weapons, the numbers in Table 1 assume it has. We
omit possible nuclear devices in North Korea, although it is
estimated that 10 plutonium weapons in the 10–20 kt range
may have been produced (Norris and Kristensen, 2005b).
India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. There
are significant differences between the stated yields of the
devices in these tests and those estimated from seismic stud-
ies (Wallace, 1998). However, the yields of some of the de-
vices were similar to the first weapons tested by the U.S., and
those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WW-II. In-
dia claims to have both fusion and fission devices (Norris and
Kristensen, 2005d). It has been suggested that India may at-
tempt to build nuclear parity with France, Britain, and China
in the next 5–7 years by constructing 300–400 warheads de-
ployed on a triad of delivery systems (missile, aircraft, and
submarine) (Norris and Kristensen, 2005d).
In Table 1 we estimate that India has between 65 and 110
weapons, with 85 being most likely. We also estimate that
Pakistan has 44–62 weapons with 52 being most likely. Our
estimate for India is identical to that of Albright et al. (1997)
for India in 2004, because we followed the Albright et al.
technique and used their numbers for Pu and HEU. Norris
and Kristensen (2005d) estimate India had 40–50 assembled
nuclear weapons in 2005. Norris and Kristensen (2006) state
that “independent experts” estimate India has 60–105 nuclear
warheads, of which 50–60 may be assembled. Norris and
Kristensen (2006) state “experts” believe Pakistan has 55–90
weapons with 40–50 assembled. Lavoy and Smith (2003)
extrapolated older estimates from Albright et al. (1997) us-
ing reactor production rates to determine that India in 2002
might have 40–120 devices, with a medium guess of 70, and
Pakistan 35–95 with a medium guess of 60.
Several countries possessed nuclear weapons in the past,
but abandoned them. South Africa constructed six devices,
which they destroyed, possibly after one nuclear test (Al-
bright et al., 1997). Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in-
herited nuclear weapons with the fall of the Soviet Union,
but have transferred them to Russia.
As summarized in Table 2, there are a large number of
countries that possess the raw materials needed to construct
nuclear weapons, mainly in their civilian nuclear reactor pro-
grams. Altogether, 45 nations are identified in Table 2 as
having previous nuclear weapons programs, current weapons
stockpiles, or the potential to become nuclear states. Thirteen
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Table 2. The dates when various countries halted their nuclear weapons programs; whether they have or once had HEU enrichment facilities,
or Pu separation facilities; and the numbers of nuclear weapons that might be constructed from Pu or HEU in their possession at the end of
2003 (Albright et al., 1997). For most countries, the Pu or HEU is in a civilian nuclear reactor programa.
Country Year abandoned HEU enrichment or Possible number Possible number
nuclear weapons program Pu separation facilities of Pu weapons, of HEU weapons,
10 kg Pu per weapon 25 kg per weapon
Nuclear Weapons States
China Active HEU, Pu 910 880
France Active HEU, Pu 23 610 1320–1372
Russia Active HEU, Pu 27 120 43 520–44 120
United Kingdom Active HEU, Pu 9630–10 240 936
United States Active HEU, Pu 50 250 28 200
De Facto Nuclear Weapons States
India Active HEU, Pu 1390–1490
Israel Active HEU (?), Pu 56 1
Pakistan Active HEU, Pu 84 44
North Korea Active HEU (?), Pu 4 1
Non-Nuclear Weapons States
Argentina >1990 HEU, Pu 1100
Armenia 140
Australia <NPTb HEU (?) 14
Belarus Inherited 1990s 10–15
Belgium Pu 2350–2450 28–30
Brazil >1990 HEU, Pu 210
Bulgaria 850
Canada <NPTb Pu 13500 54
Czech Republic 620 3–5
Egypt <NPTb
Finland 1100
Germany HEU, Pu 9300–9600 56–108
Hungary 750 6–10
Iran Active HEU (?)
Iraq 1990s
Italy 650 4–8
Japan HEU, Pu 15 160–15 360 80
Kazakhstan Inherited 1990s 300 424–438
Latvia 1
Libya 2003 1
Lithuania 1000
Mexico 240
Netherlands HEU 300–390 29–32
Poland 20
Romania >1970 Pu 240 1
Slovakia 840
Slovenia 270
South Africa >1970, created weapons HEU 580 24–30
South Korea > 1970 HEU, Pu 4400
Spain >1970 2690
Sweden <NPTb 4180
Switzerland >1970 1750–2000
Taiwan >1970 Pu 2200
Ukraine Inherited,1990s 4100 6–10
Uzbekistan 4
Yugoslavia > 1970
a Including irradiated and non-irradiated plutonium. Including HEU at all enrichment levels. Including material owned by the country but not in its territory. We omitted 237Np and
Am which can also be used in weapons.
b <NPT indicates the program was abandoned at or before signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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countries operate plutonium and/or uranium enrichment fa-
cilities, including Iran. Obtaining fissionable material, the
most difficult step in constructing a weapon, is as straightfor-
ward as operating a civilian power reactor system in tandem
with a Pu reprocessing facility of appropriate sophistication.
All of the necessary technology, equipment, and expertise
are available through international markets, which are nomi-
nally regulated to prevent proliferation. Nevertheless, as has
become apparent over the past decade, nations wishing to
build nuclear weapons seem quite capable of doing so de-
spite international restrictions and treaties. In all, 19 coun-
tries have had programs to develop nuclear weapons, notably
Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan
(Albright et al., 1997). In 1992 the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency safeguarded less than 1% of the world’s HEU
and only about 35% of the world inventory of Pu (Albright
et al., 1997). Today a similarly small fraction is safeguarded.
The possible number of nuclear devices in Table 2 that
could be constructed from existing inventories of Pu and
HEU in various countries ranges from one to tens of thou-
sands. We assumed in constructing Table 2, that 10 kg of Pu
is needed for each warhead, but we did not distinguish Pu
that has been separated from fuel rods from that which has
not been separated, and we did not distinguish Pu which is
enriched in the favored isotope, 239Pu. Weapons constructed
by the U.S. and Russia are thought to contain about 3–4 kg
of Pu; it has also been suggested that Indian weapons aver-
age 5 kg of Pu. For HEU, 25 kg per device was assumed to
derive Table 2. HEU exists in various states of enrichment of
235U, and we do not specifically distinguish weapons-grade
material. However, once uranium is enriched to the level of
HEU, most of the work needed to achieve weapons grade has
already been done, and HEU itself can be used in weapons.
There are 8 current states with nuclear weapons, 1 (North
Korea) constructing weapons and one (Iran) believed to be
actively seeking such devices. Another 32 states possess fis-
sionable material from which weapons could be produced.
Many nuclear weapons are small in size and light in weight
and could easily be transported in a car or van. The weapons
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki weighed 4040 kg and
4900 kg respectively (Gibson, 1996). Subsequent designs
have reduced warhead weight-per-yield and size substan-
tially. For example, 300 of the Intercontinental Ballistic Mis-
sile warheads in the U.S. arsenal weigh only ∼100 kg each,
while the remaining 850 warheads weigh less than 300 kg
each (Gibson, 1996). U.S. submarine-based weapons are
similarly light in weight. The U.S. also has about 480 non-
strategic B61 bombs deployed in six European countries,
with yields of 100–500 kt and weights of ∼300 kg (Gibson,
1996). The U.S. produced (and retired) 2000 W33 artillery
shells, 20 cm in width and 94 cm in length weighing∼110 kg
with a yield of 5–10 kt (Gibson, 1996).
The number of nuclear weapons owned by various nations,
how many could be successfully delivered, and where they
would be delivered are the major uncertainties in the present
analysis. As pointed out by the National Academy of Sci-
ences (2005) and Albright et al. (1997) better estimates of the
numbers of weapons will only be obtained if nations agree
to disclose such information. As discussed below there are
many scenarios for how wars might be fought. In this pa-
per we have focused on the delivery of about 50 low yield
warheads on urban centers, because that is a rough estimate
of the numbers currently existing in the smallest known nu-
clear arsenals (Table 1). One may argue that the smallest
nuclear states currently are not capable of delivering even 50
low yield weapons. However, history shows that once states
develop nuclear weapons, they continue to develop more of
them, with higher yields. Our idealized study involves about
0.3% of the world’s arsenal by number and only 0.03% by
yield. If regional nuclear arms races continue to develop, the
numbers of weapons and their yields can easily exceed the
examples we discuss here.
3 Potential fatalities from a Hiroshima-sized explosion
in a major city
To compute the number of fatalities or casualties from a nu-
clear detonation, N , we use Eq. (1).
Nfatalities/casualties =
2π∫
0
R∫
0
rP (r, θ)α(r)dθdr (1)
The integral is numerically evaluated over sectors of a city in
which the population density, P , varies in space. The proba-
bility of fatality or casualty, α depends on r, the distance from
the detonation point, or “ground zero.” R is the maximum
distance from ground zero for which the product of P and α
yields more than one fatality or casualty in a grid cell. The
probabilities for death or injury depend on the types of build-
ings, the degree of exposure of the population, the time of
day, weather, topography, and numerous other factors. How-
ever, we assume α only depends on distance from ground
zero.
Nuclear weapons cause direct destruction, death and in-
juries mainly through the effects of prompt energetic gamma
and neutron radiation, blast overpressure and winds, and
thermal radiance from the fireball (thermal pulse). (The sub-
sequent effects of exposure to radioactive fallout are dis-
cussed in Sect. 5). While there have been attempts to esti-
mate damage and casualties associated with nuclear detona-
tions of various yields on the basis of the physical perturba-
tions, there are numerous uncertainties in making such pro-
jections. However, for the scenarios considered in this work
the explosive yields correspond to those of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki atomic bombs, for which considerable data have
been collected documenting deaths and injuries. While the
detailed vulnerability of individuals in modern megacities
is likely to be significantly different from that at Hiroshima
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Fig. 2. The fatality curves from Hiroshima ((OW)-Oughertson and Warren, 1956; (IS) Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) and Nagasaki (Oughertson
and Warren, 1956), and a normal distribution fit to the Hiroshima data from Ishikawa and Swain (1981) with a standard deviation σ=1.15.
and Nagasaki, we propose that the overall casualty probabili-
ties should be similar to first-order, particularly in the central
zone of heavy destruction where most deaths occur. Accord-
ingly, for the purpose of assessing potential fatalities in a fu-
ture nuclear conflict or terrorist attack, we will rely on the
outcomes of the atomic bombing of Japan in World War II.
Figure 2 shows the Hiroshima and Nagasaki fatality rates
from two independent studies (Oughterson and Warren,
1956; Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). The fraction of people
killed within Hiroshima and Nagasaki is similar, despite the
fact that the energy released by the weapon dropped at Hi-
roshima was 15±3 kt, while that at Nagasaki was 21±2 kt.
The relatively higher rate of death in Hiroshima is probably
due to the geography of the city. Nagasaki has more hills that
shadowed areas from the blast and thermal radiation. The
firestorm in Hiroshima was also more violent due to the dry
conditions and flat terrain, which promoted widespread igni-
tion (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). Figure 3 illustrates the to-
tal casualty probabilities in Hiroshima (Ishikawa and Swain,
1981). Casualties include fatalities and injuries, counting ei-
ther only serious injuries that are life-threatening in the short
run, or all injuries including those minor injuries that are not
immediately life-threatening but could become disabling.
We have fit normal distributions to the probability data in
Figs. 2 and 3 using a standard form: α(r)= exp(−r2/2σ 2).
Here, α is the relative probability of fatalities or casualties
at a given range, r , from ground zero, and σ is the effective
scaling distance, or distribution width, for the effects of in-
terest. Values of σ derived from the data in Figs. 2 and 3 are
summarized in Table 3. We used the data from Ishikawa and
Swain (1981) to calibrate the casualty distributions because
these data refer to the period a year following the explosions
when the most serious injuries would have been resolved,
and outcomes at each level of effect would be clear. The de-
rived distributions may, nonetheless, represent a conservative
estimate of fatalities in the sense that medical attention fol-
lowing the Japanese wartime atomic bombing may have been
more accessible than would be the case following an attack
on a modern megacity, especially in the developing world.
Modern medical treatment might prove effective for at least
some of the types injuries that could not be treated during
WWII. However, the availability of medical treatment will
depend on the numbers of casualties, the damage to the med-
ical infrastructure, and the ability of outside medial experts
to enter the combatant countries (e.g. Leaning, 1986).
The Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions were airbursts.
Airbursts do not require sophisticated methods of delivery, a
light aircraft, or pressure switch is sufficient. Ground bursts
can be delivered by surface vehicles, or from the air. For
a ground burst of the same yield, the thermal radiation at
a given intensity covers only about 50% of the area of an
airburst, because the fractional conversion of yield to ra-
diant energy changes from 0.35 for an airburst to 0.18 for
a ground burst (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). In addition,
the areas affected by overpressure also vary between air and
ground bursts. For example, the area within the 10 pound-
per-square-inch (psi) contour for a ground burst is about 50%
of that for an airburst, while the area within the 2 psi contour
for a ground burst is about 38% of that for an airburst (Glas-
stone and Dolan, 1977). To adjust the probability curves for
computing fatalities and casualties from ground bursts, we
divide the appropriate σ in Table 3 by a factor of
√
2. This
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Fig. 3. The casualties in Hiroshima (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981), as well as normal distribution fits to these data with σ=1.46 and 1.87.
Casualties are defined either as the sum of fatalities plus all major injuries, or fatalities plus all injuries, even relatively minor ones.
Table 3. The characteristic widths, σ , of the fatality and casualty distributions obtained by fitting data in Figs. 2 and 3.
Parameter Width of normal distribution
Hiroshima fatalities (Ougherson and Warren, 1956) 1.0
Hiroshima fatalities (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 1.15
Hiroshima fatalities + serious injuries (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 1.46
Hiroshima fatalities + all injuries (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 1.87
Hiroshima fatalities + injuries from Ishikawa and Swain (1981) 2.05
effectively reduces the impacted area by 50% relative to an
airburst of the same yield, roughly compensating for the re-
duced range of both overpressure and thermal radiation ef-
fects.
The probability distributions derived above were com-
bined with spatial distributions of population around specific
target sites to determine total fatalities and injuries for partic-
ular detonation scenarios. We chose target sites by first deter-
mining the population within a 3 km radius about each grid
cell in the LandScan for 2003 population data base (Land-
Scan, 2003). The LandScan data base provides the 24-h av-
erage ambient population. We then chose the most popu-
lated of these regions subject to the constraint that the cen-
tral cell was separated by at least 6 km from the center cell of
the nearest alternative high population density group of cells.
The population data are aggregated into cells that are 30 arc-
seconds on a side – an area less than 1 km2 at the latitudes
of interest. In these calculations, we did not consider the ac-
cumulated casualties from multiple bursts in overlap zones
within 3 km of ground zero. In practice, for the most densely
populated regions, fatalities from the blast and thermal radi-
ation of a 15-kt explosion do not occur beyond about 5 km
from ground zero, and minor injuries do not occur beyond
about 9 km.
Table 4 presents fatalities and Table 5 casualties for air-
bursts exploded at “optimum” height over the most densely
populated, and second most densely populated, regions in a
number of countries, as well as for a ground burst in the most
densely populated region. These results could represent the
consequences of a terrorist attack, or a limited nuclear strike
or retaliation. Note that the casualties from the direct ef-
fects alone using one weapon can number more than one mil-
lion even though these scenarios assume low yield weapons.
Compared to airbursts, explosions at the ground produce
comparable, but somewhat lower, total fatalities – including
deaths attributable to radioactive fallout as discussed below.
Several previous researchers have investigated casualties in
individual cities; for example McKinzie et al. (2001) use an
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Table 4. Potential Fatalities From a Single 15-kt Detonation in a Megacity.
Country Airburst Total Airburst Total Ground Burst Blast/Fire Ground Burst Radiation Estimated Fatalities, Equivalent Number
Fatalities: Fatalities: Fatalities: Fatalities: Previous Conflicts of Airbursts
Highest Density City Second Highest Density City Highest Density City Highest Density City
Argentina 223 000 156 000 111 000 56 000 700a 1
Brazil 385 000 266 000 207 000 32 000 0 1
China 760 000 592 000 450 000 74 000 3 320 000b 6
Egypt 612 000 601 000 317 000 111 000 8500a 1
France 269 000 198 000 144 000 28 000 592 000b 3
India 571 000 469 000 419 000 62 000 3000a 1
Iran 287 000 274 000 155 000 38 000 450 000–730 000a 2–3
Israel 225 000 161 000 132 000 25 000 2800a 1
Japan 223 000 206 000 114 000 31 000 2 133 000b 14
Pakistan 503 000 487 000 249 000 103 000 3–8000a 1
Russia 299 000 237 000 152 000 35 000 17 700 000b > 50
UK 126 000 111 000 76 000 39 000 453 000b 5
U.S. 206 000 190 000 114 000 44 000 405 000b 3
a (Clodfelter, 1992). In the case of Iran, the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war was considered; for Egypt and Israel, the 1973 war; Argentina, the
1982 conflict with the UK; India and Pakistan, the 1971 war.
b (Ellis, 1993). Russian fatalities are derived from those for the USSR during WW-II.
Table 5. Summary of casualties from one nuclear explosion of 15 kt yielda.
Country Severe injuries/slight
injuries/total casualties, one air-
burst, highest density city
(thousands)
Severe injuries/slight
injuries/total casualties, one air-
burst, second highest
density location
(thousands)
Severe injuries/slight
injuries/total casualties, one
ground burst, highest density city
(thousands)
Argentina 123/179/526 77/102/335 70/109/290
Brazil 165/197/746 80/83/430 114/156/477
China 265/297/1,322 166/165/923 203/258/911
Egypt 317/450/1,379 264/342/1,207 184/283/785
France 126/166/561 92/123/418 79/116/339
India 249/327/1,147 212/273/954 160/230/709
Iran 127/157/571 134/197/606 84/119/358
Israel 81/91/397 65/74/300 60/78/271
Japan 117/163/503 117/177/500 68/104/287
Pakistan 272/381/1,155 261/363/1,111 159/242/651
Russia 157/229/685 100/142/479 92/140/384
UK 41/48/214 62/85/258 33/40/149
U.S. 94/131/430 77/103/370 58/85/257
a Total casualties include fatalities plus all injuries. For the ground bursts casualties caused by radiation are not considered.
approach similar to ours for Pakistan and India. While a pre-
cise comparison is not feasible, they estimate 2.9 million fa-
talities and 7.7 million casualties if 10 cities in Pakistan and
India were attacked with Hiroshima sized weapons. In our
scenario we do not attack individual cities, but population
concentrations. For our ten highest density regions in India
and Pakistan we find 4.3 million fatalities and 8.9 million
casualties.
The number of fatalities during WW-II in Hiroshima
has been estimated at 140 000±10 000, and in Nagasaki,
70 000±10 000 (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). Modern megac-
ities have higher population densities than Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and consequently would suffer greater fatalities,
as indicated in Table 4. Historical wars in most countries, in-
cluding India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Argentina, and Brazil,
have caused fatalities (Table 4) of only a few percent of those
that could be produced by a single airburst.
There are numerous uncertainties in computing fatalities
and casualties. We believe that the uncertainties in our anal-
ysis, such as using the casualty probability curves from Hi-
roshima, and using the LandScan population database, are
relatively small. For instance, in Table 4 the average ratio of
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fatalities in the air and ground bursts is 1.85 for a factor of 2
change in σ 2. Since the area within a given damage contour
is proportional to σ 2, one would expect the ratio to be 2 if the
population density were uniform over the area. The ratio of
1.85, slightly less than 2, indicates that the population is con-
centrated in the center of the area so that slightly less damage
occurs as the zone of destruction expands. As noted in Ta-
ble 3 two estimates of the Hiroshima fatalities give σ 2 values
whose ratio is 1.3. Hence, had we chosen the casualty curve
of Oughterson and Warren (1956) instead of Ishikawa and
Swain (1981) we would have calculated fatalities that were
about 30% lower than in Table 4. In order to investigate the
sensitivity of our results to the population database we also
investigated fatalities in China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and
the USA using the population database from Columbia Uni-
versity (CIESIN, 2004). This population database is on a
coarser grid than LandScan, with a typical area per grid cell
near 20 km2 at the latitude of Pakistan. Hence, the popula-
tion density does not vary over the typical scale of the nuclear
damage area. The data we used were for 1995 from CIESIN,
while LANDSCAN updates data to remain as current as pos-
sible. In this case we found that with the CIESIN database
fatalities were 20% greater for the USA but only 23% as
large for China than with LANDSCAN. As discussed in the
next section we also investigated the fatalities from attacks on
the 50 most populated regions for several countries. In this
case the two databases yield results within 10% for India and
Japan. The CIESIN database yields 30% higher fatalities for
the USA, but only 40% as high fatalities for China and about
50% for Pakistan. We believe that the CIESIN database is
not on a fine enough scale to be reliable for these calcula-
tions. As we discussed above a difference of about 10% is
likely due to not being able to integrate the fatality curves
over the population distribution. We expect, however, that
the larger differences for China and Pakistan reflect the large
increase in urban population that has occurred between the
1995 CIESIN database and the 2003 LandScan database. To
summarize, the differences between LandScan and CIESEN
are not random, but rather due to lower spatial resolution and
older data in the CIESIN database, which is why we chose to
use the LANDSCAN data. Likewise we chose the Ishikawa
and Swain (1981) fatality curves because they were done at
a later time when more data were available.
The greatest uncertainty in our fatality estimates, as noted
in the introduction, is likely to lie in the targeting of the
weapons, and in the types of weapons used. Table 4 shows
that ground bursts are likely to produce about 75% as many
fatalities as air bursts, but, as discussed later, also leave be-
hind lingering radiation. We previously discussed the 33%
fewer fatalities that occur if one targets the 10 largest cities
in India and Pakistan rather than the ten most densely pop-
ulated regions. Based on our discussions of the linear re-
lation of damage area to σ 2, and to the fact that the dam-
age area varies linearly with yield, it follows that the fatal-
ities will be roughly proportional to yield. The yield could
vary by a factor of 10 or more from our assumed 15-kt, de-
pending on the sophistication of the weapons maker. There
are numerous other uncertainties related to the use of the
weapons. For example, the populations of some urban ar-
eas vary greatly between day and night due to commuting
patterns. Hence, casualties will depend on the time of day
of the attack. The LandScan data base defines a 24-h aver-
age population density, which therefore lies between the ex-
treme possibilities. Casualties will also depend upon whether
the urban areas have been evacuated in advance of the attack
or whether bomb shelters exist. We have assumed there has
been no evacuation, or effective use of shelters. Firstly, ur-
gent evacuation of megacities has never been successfully at-
tempted. Moreover, few of these cities have nuclear-capable
shelters in any number. While some modern buildings are
better designed to survive shock waves, and are less likely to
ignite, we have implicitly assumed that all buildings would
respond like those in Hiroshima during World War II. Some
cities may have complex topography that may provide par-
tial sheltering as in Nagasaki. As discussed in Sect. 4 some
targets have several times higher populations densities and
will therefore have higher fatalities than others. In this sec-
tion of the paper we chose examples based on attacks on the
most densely populated areas in numerous countries listed in
Table 4. The effects of choosing alternative urban targets is
discussed in Sect. 4.
4 Potential direct casualties in a regional war
Several groups, considering a range of exchange scenarios,
estimated the direct casualties in a full-scale nuclear war
prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the easing of
tensions between the larger nuclear powers. Tens of thou-
sands of weapons were available in the 1980s with most in
the 100 kt to Mt yield range. Varying assumptions about tar-
geting of the weapons, and the number of weapons used led
to casualty estimates differing by more than a factor of ten.
Another source of differences between casualty estimates is
the scaling of casualty probabilities from low yield weapons,
such as the one used in Hiroshima, to high yield weapons.
Most researchers use blast damage to scale casualty prob-
abilities. Others have used fire potential, which leads to a
greater damage area and generally higher casualty figures by
factors of 2.5–4 (Postol, 1986).
At the high end of casualty projections, the “Ambio” study
(Middleton, 1982) assumed 14 747 detonations (173 in the
Southern Hemisphere) totaling 5569 Mt. Although, as Ta-
ble 1 indicates, such a conflict could still be fought today,
many of the warheads would need to be taken from stor-
age. The “Ambio” analysis assumed weapons exploded over
nearly every city of modest size in the world (most of Africa,
South America, and New Zealand were spared). Of the
1 300 000 000 people then living in urban areas of the North-
ern Hemisphere, it was estimated that 750 000 000 would die
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immediately, 340 000 000 would be seriously injured – and
of those 200 000 000 would perish soon there after. Har-
well (1984) considered an attack confined to the U.S. in-
volving more than 3000 weapons and 1400 Mt yield, and
found that 50 000 000–100 000 000 people might die from
blast, thermal radiation, and fires. OTA (1979) summa-
rized several U.S. government studies of a range of scenar-
ios, including a full-scale attack on the U.S. against mili-
tary and economic targets involving thousands of weapons
releasing thousands of megatons of explosive energy. They
suggested that casualties, primarily due to blast, would lie
in the range of 20 000 000–160 000 000 people. The range
of casualties was largely due to assumptions about evacu-
ations of urban areas, and use of shelters. They also ex-
amined a “counterforce attack,” in which military facilities
were attacked while U.S. urban centers were not directly tar-
geted. In this case, fatalities, due largely to fallout, were
estimated to be 2 000 000–20 000 000 people. Daugherty et
al. (1986) pointed out that many strategic targets lie near pop-
ulation centers. They considered a counterforce attack on the
U.S. with 3000 warheads and 1340 Mt yield, and deduced
that 7 000 000–19 000 000 deaths might occur immediately
from blast and fires in urban areas. Many more fatalities
could also be associated with radioactive fallout.
In our computations we have assumed that the densest
population centers in each country are targeted. There are
many circumstances that could trigger a regional-scale nu-
clear conflict, and many scenarios for the conduct of the en-
suing war. For instance, analysts (Lavoy and Smith, 2003)
suggest Pakistan and India could get into a nuclear war be-
cause a conventional conflict threatened to overwhelm the
strategic conventional forces or command and control struc-
ture of either side. Alternatively they might launch a nuclear
war to preempt a nuclear attack, real or imagined, by their ad-
versary. Iran and Israel, and numerous other countries, might
exchange nuclear weapons for similar reasons in the future.
In our analysis we assumed that the densest population cen-
ters in each country-usually in megacities-are attacked. Such
an urban attack might be conducted to inflict maximum dam-
age. It is likely that military targets would also be attacked.
We have not attempted to locate specific military targets, and
ignored casualties related to such targets, but note that many
military targets are in cities. Hence the “small” wars assumed
here are similar in principle, if not in scale, to the strategies
for all out nuclear warfare and war fighting embraced by the
superpowers in the mid-20th century in the context of “mu-
tually assured destruction”.
Below we consider a nuclear war in which 50 weapons of
15 kt yield are detonated on two opposing nations. The to-
tal yield in this case is 1.5 Mt, roughly 0.1% or less of the
total yields proposed in previous scenarios for a full-scale
nuclear war as discussed above. Such a scenario is consis-
tent with the potential arsenals of the smallest recognized
nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. One may argue that this
scenario is currently implausible because India and Pakistan
would need to have their entire arsenals assembled, and a
high success rate of delivery to cause 50 nuclear explosions
in each territory. However, other nuclear powers have many
more weapons and sophisticated delivery systems and could
launch such an attack. Moreover, once states begin to as-
semble nuclear weapons they tend to continue to build their
arsenals. For example, India may be moving toward an arse-
nal comparable to that of China, Britain and France (Norris
and Kristensen, 2005d). North Korea has reactors, which if
completed and made fully operational, could produce enough
fissionable material to produce 50 warheads per year (Norris
and Kristensen, 2005b). Whether Pakistan is planning such
a reactor is uncertain, but India has recently signed a treaty
with the U.S. allowing the continued, and unmonitored, pro-
duction of fissionable materials. Numerous countries listed
in Table 2 have the uranium and/or plutonium to make very
large numbers of weapons. Hence we consider an attack
involving two countries using 50 low-yield weapons to be
within the range of the smallest nuclear powers today, and
potentially attainable by many countries in the near future.
Tables 6 and 7 present our estimates of the fatalities and
casualties due to targeting 50 15-kt weapons on the leading
population centers in a number of countries. The total fatal-
ities in Table 6 range from 2 600 000–16 700 000. An attack
on India, for example, would lead to many more fatalities
than a similar attack on Pakistan because of India’s greater
number of large population centers.
In most of our simulations targets cluster within the
megacities located in the combatant countries. For example,
Fig. 4, shows the locations of the 28 targets in Japan that fall
within the Tokyo-Yokohama region for an attack on Japan
using 15-kt yield weapons targeted at the 50 densest popula-
tion centers. In many countries, half the fatalities occur in a
single megacity in our scenario, as summarized in Fig. 5.
Figure 6 shows that fatalities are relatively uniformly
spread over the 50 targets in most countries, so that fatali-
ties are not strongly dependent on the details of the choice of
targets. For instance, in India and for China, 19 explosions
account for roughly half the total airburst fatalities from a 50
weapon attack.
The fatalities in Table 6 for a 50-weapon attack on the
United States are comparable to those previously estimated
for a limited or counterforce attack involving 3000 weapons
and 1300 Mt (OTA, 1979; Daugherty et al., 1986). Scaled
against total weapon yield, the fatalities per kiloton are 100
times greater in the small weapon scenario, even when full
scale urban targeting has been considered in past scenarios
(Harwell, 1984). The high fatality rate of low yield weapons
is not due to any non-linear phenomena. While the use
of thousands of high-yield weapons would certainly lead to
more casualties than might occur in a small attack or ex-
change with low-yield weapons, the number of casualties is
not reduced in proportion to the total yield because of ineffi-
cient use of the huge arsenals of high yield weapons. For ex-
ample, even today Russia and the USA maintain much larger
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Table 6. Fatality estimates for 50 15-kt detonations in urban zones.
Country Blast and Fire Fatalities: Blast and Fire Fatalities: Radiation Fatalities:
Airbursts Ground Bursts Ground Bursts
Argentina 4 337 000 2 394 000 810 000
Brazil 7 962 000 4 370 000 1 834 000
China 16 716 000 9 306 000 2 554 000
Egypt 7 834 000 4 384 000 1 656 000
France 3 509 000 1 879 000 923 000
India 12 424 000 6 494 000 2 539 000
Iran 7 431 000 4 231 000 1 371 000
Israel 2 594 000 1 538 000 323 000
Japan 5 890 000 3 023 000 1 766 000
Pakistan 9 171 000 5 112 000 1 525 000
Russia 6 273 000 3 543 000 1 299 000
UK 2 891 000 1 565 000 792 000
U.S. 4 056 000 2 203 000 872 000
Table 7. Summary of casualties from 50 weapons with 15 kt yielda.
Country Severe injuries/slight injuries/total casualties, Severe injuries/slight injuries/total casualties,
50 airburst weapons (thousands ) 50 ground burst weapons (thousands )
Argentina 1846/2233/8415 1242/1736/5371
Brazil 3522/4445/15 929 2283/3267/9920
China 6955/8560/32 230 4755/6550/20 611
Egypt 3146/3623/14 604 2219/3011/9614
France 1570/1907/6986 1037/1472/4388
India 6069/7853/26 347 3731/5552/15 776
Iran 2890/3316/13 637 2064/2772/9067
Israel 868/918/4380 693/863/3094
Japan 2991/3953/12 834 1797/2716/7536
Pakistan 3830/4562/17 563 2597/3613/11 321
Russia 2468/2897/11 638 1762/2362/7667
UK 1287/1621/5799 845/1199/3608
U.S. 1825/2305/8186 1176/1691/5070
a Total casualties include fatalities plus all injuries. For the ground bursts radiation caused casualties are not considered.
arsenals than are needed to strike all significant military tar-
gets as well as every moderate to large city in the adversary
country. Many weapons are aimed at the same target, or
aimed at missile silos or submarines in unpopulated regions.
For high-yield weapons in the Mt range, much of the area in-
side the destruction zone would be sparsely populated- even
in large cities- as the population density decreases rapidly to-
ward the perimeter. Therefore, based on the present results,
relatively small numbers of low yield weapons targeted at
densely populated urban centers may lead to similar casual-
ties as in a full-scale counterforce war.
Table 6 also shows that a regional exchange between In-
dia and Pakistan, in which each side used 50 weapons, could
lead to more than 21 million fatalities, which is equivalent
to about half of the global fatalities in WW-II. Only a small
number of weapons are needed to produce the same fatalities
in a given country as occurred among that country’s citizens
during WW-II, or in other major historical wars. For exam-
ple, three weapons of 15-kt yield exploding in the U.S. could
lead to more U.S. fatalities than occurred during all of WW-
II.
The uncertainties discussed for individual targets in Sect. 3
also apply to a regional scale war. Generally we believe the
greatest uncertainties have to do with targeting issues, such
as the time of day of the attack and whether cities have been
evacuated before an attack. For a regional scale war the num-
bers and yields of weapons that are actually exploded, and
the targets chosen is a significant uncertainty. As illustrated
in Fig. 6 the numbers of fatalities varies almost linearly with
the numbers of weapons used near the 50th target. In general
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50
Fig. 4. Targeted areas in the Tokyo/Yokohama, Japanese megacity complex are identified for the scenario used in the present analysis. The
axes are latitude and longitude. Of the 50 hypothetical Japanese targets, 28 are located in this urban complex. Circles of 2-km radius define
the areas around target points where fires are likely. The blue shades indicate fatalities per grid cell from an airburst. No fatalities occur in
the gray regions, which are shaded according to population per grid cell.
Fig. 5. Total fatalities predicted for specific megacities in several countries. The numbers on the bars represent the percentage of the country’s
fatalities occurring in the megacity. Buenos Aires, Cairo, London, Moscow, New York, Paris, and Tokyo account for 46–59% of their national
fatalities for the scenario treated.
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Fig. 6. Potential fatalities caused by airbursts of 15-kt yield on each of 50 targets in the countries listed. These curves are well fit with simple
analytic formulas. For example for China, Fatalities=703 442-124 303Ln(target number), for Pakistan Fatalities=528 435-11 6181Ln(target
number), for the U.S. Fatalities=208 940-43 044Ln(target number).
these curves are well fit over the entire range with a relation-
ship in which the number of fatalities is proportional to the
natural log of the target number. Explicit equations are given
in the Fig. 6 caption for several examples.
5 Radioactive fallout
In previous calculations for a full-scale nuclear war, radioac-
tive fallout was a significant source of fatalities. For exam-
ple, Harwell (1984) predicted about 25% of the United States
land area would be exposed to a long-term fatal dose of radi-
ation, resulting in 50 000 000 to 70 000 000 fatalities in addi-
tion to those due to direct effects such as blast. The radioac-
tivity is primarily associated with surface explosions, which
are typically used to attack “hardened” or buried military tar-
gets, such as missile silos. However, surface bursts generally
cause fewer blast or fire fatalities. Harwell (1984), for exam-
ple, found that when all of the urban explosions were surface
bursts, the total number of fatalities was actually reduced by
10 000 000.
There have been numerous studies of early radioactive
fallout from nuclear surface bursts, and potential exposure
to energetic radiation, especially gamma rays, emitted by
the residual radionuclides. Early fallout consists of the dust-
borne radioactive byproducts deposited on the ground during
the first day or so after a nuclear surface explosion. Sur-
face bursts raise large amounts of dust, which carries most of
the short-lived radioactive isotopes released in fission deto-
nations. Subsequent fallout patterns depend on the dust par-
ticle size distribution, height of the stabilized debris cloud,
and local weather, among other factors. Airbursts generally
are assumed to produce no early fallout unless it is raining, as
discussed below. In general, most of the lethal fallout from
a small surface burst (e.g., 15 kt) is deposited within one to
two hours of detonation, and within several tens of kilome-
ters of ground zero. Moreover, the threat of fallout exposure
within 2–3 km of such a burst is secondary to the hazards as-
sociated with prompt radiation (emitted at the time of detona-
tion), blast, and thermal radiation. Since these latter effects
are directly accounted for by the casualty curves discussed
above, we will not be concerned here with detailed model-
ing of the fallout closer than one or two kilometers to ground
zero (although the model discussed below will roughly ac-
count for this fallout).
Given the complexity of the fallout problem, and sensi-
tivity to parameters such as wind speed, rainfall and dust
particle size that cannot be determined in advance, we uti-
lize the simplified fallout model documented by Glasstone
and Dolan (1977) to compute areas subject to given expo-
sure levels downwind of a surface contact burst. This model
was based upon experience from nuclear weapons tests.
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Fig. 7. (top): Potential unsheltered 48-h whole-body gamma ray
dose downwind of a 15-kt ground burst based on the simplified fall-
out model documented in Table 9.93 and Fig. 9.26 in Glasstone and
Dolan (1977). These values do not include reductions for surface
roughness, or for purposeful sheltering. The 48-h period of expo-
sure is assumed to begin when fallout reaches the distance indicated,
although roughly 80–90% of the total dose is received within the
first 24 h. For an assumed 24 km/h steady wind with minimal verti-
cal shear, the initial times range from about 10 min to 2 h after deto-
nation. (bottom): Ground zero width of a given dose contour based
on the same model (for example, the ground zero cross-sectional
width of the area contour in which the 48-h unsheltered dose is at
least 1000 rad is about 1 km); the maximum width occurs downwind
of the burst at a distance determined by the wind speed at ground
zero but varies little from the ground zero width. For each set of
data, a power law fit is shown.
In applying the model, Table 9.93 and Fig. 9.26 of Glas-
stone and Dolan (1977) are used to characterize the dose
rate, and integrated dose, downwind of a 15-kt fission ground
burst. The results are summarized in Fig. 7 in terms of the
potential external gamma ray dose that would be received
after 48 h of continuous exposure over a perfectly flat sur-
face as a function of distance from the detonation. The de-
rived doses must be corrected for terrain and sheltering as
discussed below. Typically, 50–60% of the total fission ra-
dioactivity produced by a surface burst is deposited as early
fallout, and this factor is incorporated in the model (Glas-
stone and Dolan, 1977; Shapiro et al., 1986).
The model (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977) assumes there is a
steady 24-km/h wind with minimal wind shear. We take the
wind to blow directly toward the east, as prevailing wester-
lies although in reality the winds could blow in any direction,
and in some countries we consider prevail toward the west.
The delay in fallout exposure associated with transport from
the detonation point is accounted for by estimating the arrival
time using the derived distance and known wind speed. The
fallout radiation dose rate decays in proportion to t−1.2, with
time, t, measured in appropriate units (Glasstone and Dolan,
1977). Given an arrival time, and an exposure interval of
2 days, a dose rate “multiplying factor” can be obtained by
time integration of the dose rate. The actual 48-h dose is then
the product of the reference time dose rate and the multiply-
ing factor.
Figure 7a shows the potential maximum 48-h whole-body
dose as a function of downwind distance from a 15-kt burst
obtained from the Glasstone and Dolan (1977) model. Fig-
ure 7b gives the ground zero crosswind width of the contour
delimiting that dose. The data in Figs. 7a and b have been
fit with power law functions for convenience in our analy-
sis. The 48-h unsheltered exposure at each distance directly
downwind of a surface detonation can be reasonably esti-
mated using the relation,
D = 266 000
/
L1.838 (2)
where D is the integrated dose in rad, and L is the distance
from ground zero in km. Note that Eq. (2) can be inverted
to give the maximum downwind extent for any specific dose,
D. The simplified model of Glasstone and Dolan (1977) also
predicts that, for a 15-kt fission explosion, the width of the
dose contour is nearly independent of the range from the det-
onation point. Hence, we further assume that for a particular
dose, the contour width, W (km), remains constant over the
range given by Eq. (2). The fit in Fig. 7b gives this width as,
W = 40
/
D0.5486. (3)
Based on the assumptions stated above, the derived exposure
footprints for early fallout from a 15-kt surface burst consist
of rectangular areas, L×W, defined through Eqs. (2) and (3),
that extend to the east of the burst point.
For the scenarios considered here, the population grid cells
are generally comparable to or larger in width than the expo-
sure contours that fall within the lethal range. Moreover, in
multiple burst scenarios, the dose contours often overlap. In
cases where we must estimate the affected population in sub-
grid areas, we assume a uniform population density within
affected grid cells, so that the exposed population is directly
proportional to the fractional area. We also sum exposures
from overlapping explosion contours. Figure 8a, for exam-
ple, illustrates the 48-h exposures predicted for unsheltered
individuals in the Tokyo-Yokohama megacity complex cor-
responding to a 50-weapon attack on Japan. Note that there
are many areas where a number of fallout patterns overlap in
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such an attack, and the total exposure consists of the additive
component exposures.
Following Daugherty et al. (1986), we assume that 50%
of the population will have a sheltering factor of 3, and 50%
a sheltering factor of 10. Hence, the true exposure, D′ is,
D′=D/3 or D/10. The response of a population to a given
acute (48-h) dose of whole-body radiation is uncertain. The
dose that is lethal to 50% of the exposed individuals has been
estimated in various studies to lie between 220 and 450 rad
(Daugherty et al., 1986). We use 450 rad in the present anal-
ysis. We further assume, based on Daugherty et al. (1986),
that the fatality curve is linear with dose, and that the fatal-
ity rate would be 100% at 600 rad, and 0% at 300 rad. Then
the fraction of fatalities for a given acute exposure (above
300 rad) is:
αradiation fatality = (D′−300)/300; 0 < α < 1 (4)
The doses used in Eq. (4) are those modified for the effects of
sheltering. Hence, the unsheltered dose rate that represents
the threshold for lethality (from fallout alone) is 900 rad for
50% of the affected population, and 3000 rad for the other
50%.
Given these parameters the fallout from a 15-kt ground
burst could be lethal to all the survivors of blast and
fire within a zone extending roughly 8 km downwind, and
0.35 km wide. At distances greater than about 22 km from
ground zero, there would be few fallout fatalities, although
radiation sickness would affect a substantial number of in-
dividuals exposed to radiation at 100–300 rad (with effects
potentially exacerbated by other stresses, and the absence of
an organized medical response). Between the epicenter of
the explosion and 22 km, there would be zones of varying
widths in which a fraction of the population suffers lethal
exposure. For example, the dark purple areas illustrated in
Fig. 8b for the Tokyo-Yokohama megacity attack scenario
would be subject to numerous early fallout casualties.
There has been limited consideration in the literature of
the effects of rainfall on radioactive fallout (Glasstone and
Dolan, 1977). This is due in part to the fact that most
high-yield weapons rise and stabilize in the atmosphere well
above the region where rainfall develops. However, the
stabilized height of a 15-kt airburst debris cloud is around
6000 m, which is within the middle troposphere (Glasstone
and Dolan, 1977). The top of the Nagasaki mushroom cloud
was estimated to be 4000–5000 m, with a base near 1200–
1300 m (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). It follows that a 15-kt
yield device initially deposits its radioactivity in the middle
to lower troposphere. In this case, rapid removal is likely
if the atmosphere is unstable and rainfall is occurring in the
region. For this reason, atmospheric nuclear tests were det-
onated in remote locations, in part to avoid local rainfall ef-
fects (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Precipitation might scav-
enge radioactive debris from the plume of an airburst at the
same rate as dry sedimentation removes radioactivity from
a ground-burst cloud. Moreover, rainfall could potentially
Fig. 8. (top): Map of estimated radiation doses (rads) for unshel-
tered individuals in the Tokyo-Yokohama megacity. The axes refer
to latitude and longitude. The black circles locate ∼2-km radius
zones of destruction by fire around each target. (bottom): Locations
where most of the fatalities due to early fallout would occur (the
darker purple contours indicating very high fatality rates per grid
cell, as discussed in the text). The background shading depicts the
population per grid cell, with the darker grey representing the high-
est density. Both the radiation cells and the radiation fatality grid
cells are 1/25 the area of a population grid cell.
deposit twice as much radioactivity locally following an air-
burst as a ground burst in dry weather, since in the latter case
only about half the radioactivity is in the form of particles
large enough to be deposited as early fallout. As discussed
later the mass fires likely to occur after a nuclear explosion
are capable of generating pyro-convection and possible as-
sociated rainfall. However, it takes several hours after the
explosion for these clouds to develop, by which time the nu-
clear debris cloud will have blown away. Hence preexisting
natural rainfall in the area of the explosion is the source of
greatest concern for short-term radioactivity from an airburst.
For the scenarios considered here, Tables 4 and 6 provide
estimates of the fatalities due to the early fallout from single
and multiple ground bursts without rainfall. While the radia-
tion casualties are substantial in the cases treated, the total of
blast, fire and radiation fatalities for ground bursts are found
to be somewhat lower in general than the direct fatalities of
an airburst of equivalent yield. Rainfall has the potential to
increase radiation fatalities significantly.
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Delayed, as opposed to early, radioactive fallout generally
occurs within the first day or two after a nuclear explosion,
and far downwind of ground zero. Global-scale fallout is
associated mainly with high yield weapons whose radioac-
tivity is deposited initially in the stratosphere, and is then
slowly removed over the globe. Intermediate fallout is as-
sociated with radioactive debris that remains trapped in the
troposphere, and which is deposited regionally. About 500
nuclear weapons were exploded in the atmosphere world-
wide prior to the nuclear test ban treaty, with a total yield
expended of more than 400 Mt. Of greater relevance here,
100 airburst weapons with an average yield of 10 kt were
detonated over the Nevada test site (NTS). About 61 of these
devices had a high enough yield to produce measurable ra-
dioactivity beyond the NTS (Bouville et al., 2002). The tests
were deliberately conducted in locally dry conditions, so that
the debris would remain aloft as long as possible, decaying
and dispersing before returning to the surface. Occasionally
hot spots, such as in northern New York State, occurred as
a result of rainfall scavenging. In the U.S., the overall cu-
mulative external population exposure associated with the
100 small weapons exploded at the NTS was comparable
to that connected with the global fallout from the 400 Mt of
large weapon tests (Bouville et al., 2002). The smaller bursts
were more effective per unit fission yield because the shorter-
lived fission radioisotopes were much more rapidly deposited
(Bouville et al., 2002). The radioactive debris from the larger
weapons was injected into the stratosphere, where it decayed
significantly before reaching the ground. In counties down-
wind of the NTS, average exposures of the order of 300 mrad
have been estimated (Bouville et al., 2002), which is com-
parable to the average annual radiation dose from natural ra-
dioactivity.
In a regional-scale nuclear war, radiation doses over large
areas would most likely exceed doses experienced during the
NTS series. For one thing, the detonations would occur si-
multaneously rather than over a decade of time, and would
be deposited in the same restricted area. Moreover, local
rainfall is more probable in the regions considered here, and
could significantly exacerbate the local and regional depo-
sition of radioactivity. The fallout simulation illustrated in
Fig. 8a shows, for example, that most of the greater Tokyo
area, and extending more than 100 km downwind, is subject
to unprotected 48-h doses of 50 to 200 rad. In the same zone,
the cumulative dose between 1 day and six months would
be roughly half the values for 48-h – still a very substan-
tial exposure equivalent to perhaps a thousand times back-
ground. Under such circumstances, it is likely that only a
small fraction of the population would remain within the ur-
ban complex, being limited mainly to those directly engaged
in disaster relief and civil defense activities.
While regional and global fallout are not likely to cause
substantial fatalities following a war between states with
small arsenals (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977), it is much more
likely that large urban areas around target points would be
permanently abandoned, especially following ground bursts–
or airbursts under rainy conditions. A nuclear explosion re-
leases many short and long-lived radionuclides, amounting
to roughly 30 000 MCi per kiloton of fission yield at one
minute after detonation (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Thus,
the evacuation of large regions would be necessary immedi-
ately after a nearby surface burst. However, the deposition
of long-lived radioisotopes, as occurred after the Chernobyl
nuclear reactor accident in April 1986, would make early re-
covery and re-colonization untenable in contaminated zones.
Chernobyl released about 2.5 MCi of 137Cs and 0.27 MCi of
90Sr, (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002). In contrast, 50 nu-
clear explosions of 15 kt fission yield would be expected
to release about 0.2 MCi of 137Cs and 0.14 MCi of 90Sr,
both with half-lives close to 30 yr. Notably, the local de-
position following Chernobyl was attenuated owing to the
small particle sizes released by the reactor, and most of the
activity dissipated over long distances, whereas early ra-
dioactive fallout would concentrate activity locally. Nev-
ertheless, shortly after the Chernobyl accident, a region of
2800 km2 was evacuated, which exceeds the total area af-
fected by blast in the nuclear scenarios considered here. Sev-
eral other radioactive “hotspots” were located within a few
hundred kilometers of Chernobyl where rainfall deposition
occurred. In total, 3100 km2 was contaminated by 137Cs at
levels above 40 Ci/km2, 7000 km2 at levels between 16 and
40 Ci/km2, and 103 000 km2 between 1 and 5 Ci/km2 (Nu-
clear Energy Agency, 2002). Eventually the Soviet Union
adopted a ground-contamination upper-limit of 40 Ci/km2
of 137Cs for permanent resettlement of population, and 15–
40 Ci/km2 for temporary relocation. In this latter zone, con-
sumption of contaminated food remains strictly controlled;
the 193 000 people living here in 1995 received an annual
dose below 500 mrads (where 300 mrads is the average an-
nual dose received from natural background radioactivity)
(Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002). Sixteen years after the ac-
cident, 4000 km2 of agricultural land remained abandoned,
including the entire area within 30 km of the reactor. Follow-
ing the attack scenarios considered here, slightly smaller to-
tal areas might be abandoned or strictly controlled, but these
areas would be within, or adjacent to, current megacity cen-
ters. Accordingly, the population and economic assets af-
fected would dwarf the Chernobyl values.
The uncertainty in computing the radioactivity deposited
from the explosion of 50 weapons with 15 kt yield lies in
variables such as the local wind speed, and whether it was
raining during the explosion. However, the greatest uncer-
tainty is due to targeting issues, such as whether ground
bursts are used. Fatalities due to fallout exposure depend on
how well sheltered the population is, and how quickly it can
evacuate the region.
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6 Smoke emissions
During the early 1980s, numerous investigations of smoke
emissions from burning cities suggested that significant
global-scale climate changes might occur following a nuclear
war (Alexandrov and Stenchikov, 1983; Turco et al., 1983,
1990; Pittock et al., 1985). Climate changes could impact
non-combatant countries worldwide, and potentially lead to
significant global casualties. At that time, significant climate
effects were expected from 100 high yield weapons being
used on 100 cities, but given the large numbers of weapons
then available such a scenario did not seem likely. Here we
estimate the smoke generated from 100 low yield weapons
being used on 100 targets, many of which may be co-located
in a single megacity. Robock et al. (2007) evaluate the cli-
mate changes that may occur from this estimated smoke re-
lease.
It is not practical to employ currently limited informa-
tion on land-use in hundreds of urban complexes around the
world to determine accurately the local and regional distri-
butions of combustible materials that could be ignited by nu-
clear bursts. To estimate fuel loadings for the present work,
we make a basic assumption that within urban zones there
is a direct relationship between the quantity of fuel avail-
able and the local population density. Contributing to the
fuel load would be dwellings, offices, industries and infras-
tructure such as schools, transport and fuel depots, shopping
malls, and so on. Given the relationship between fuel loading
and population density we can use population density data
as a surrogate for fuel loading data. In the next section we
discuss the relationship between fuel loading and population
density, as well as other parameters needed to determine the
smoke emissions. Next we discuss the altitude to which the
smoke plumes might rise. We then apply this technique to de-
termine smoke emissions from attacks on a number of cities
and countries.
6.1 Estimating fuel loading and smoke emissions
We estimate the mass of carbonaceous smoke (often referred
to as elemental carbon, or soot) emitted by fires ignited by a
single detonation in a specific location as follows:
Me =
J∑
j=1
PjAj
{
Mf
(∑
i=1,n
FiQiSiCi
)
R
}
(5)
Here, Me is the total mass of the potential soot emission. The
outer sum, j , is over all grid cells in the region affected by
the explosion and subject to fire ignition. Pj is the population
density (people/km2) within the grid cell j , which can be
determined using an appropriate population database for the
area (LandScan, 2003). Aj is the area of the grid cell, or the
fractional area impacted by fire. In summing, we include a
total of J cells arranged symmetrically around ground zero
such that the total area burned following a 15-kt explosion is
13 km2, equivalent to that consumed at Hiroshima (Glasstone
and Dolan, 1977).
The term within brackets does not vary with location
around ground zero in this treatment. The key parameter,
Mf , represents the baseline per capita mass of fuel of all
types estimated for the nation and locale of interest. In prac-
tice, we establish a baseline for the developed world circa
1980, and scale the results for other circumstances (see be-
low). In the past, two techniques have been employed to
determine the baseline fuel burden. Turco et al. (1990) ana-
lyzed the total quantities of various types of flammable ma-
terials that were produced and utilized annually in developed
nations. Then, with an estimate of the relevant residence
time (in years) for each material, the total quantities of fuel
were determined. The most extensive information available
at the time related to the 1980s. The total amount of all
fuels in the developed world at the time was estimated to
be 11.4±3.6×103 Tg (teragram, or 1012 g=106 metric ton),
where the range represented the minimum and maximum
likely values. Dividing by the total population of the devel-
oped world in 1980 – about 1.1×109people – a mean value,
Mf =1.1±0.4×107 g/person, was derived.
An alternative approach to find Mf was taken by Small
(1989) and Bush et al. (1991). They surveyed land-use
in a cross-section of U.S. cites, and incorporated data on
the amounts of combustible materials in typical structures,
including various types of residences, industries and busi-
nesses. Their analysis yielded a total quantity of fuel in
U.S. urban “target zones” of about 1322 Tg. Specifically,
the targeted areas were delimited using an attack scenario
that involved hundreds of megaton-sized weapons. However,
Small (1989) did not quantify the number of individuals af-
fected within targeted cities, stating more generally that one-
half of the entire urban-suburban area of the U.S. lay within
the target zones. Using the entire urban population of the
U.S. in 1980 (152 million), a lower limit of the fuel per capita
would therefore be 8.7×106 g/person. Assuming that one-
half of the population resided in target zones at the time, the
inferred per capita fuel loading would be 1.7×107 g/person.
These results roughly bracket the range derived by Turco et
al. (1990). Accordingly, a baseline per capita fuel burden,
Mf , of 1.1×107 g/person is adopted here. Later, we return
to the question of modern fuel loadings, and combustibles in
other parts of the world.
In Eq. (5), Fi is a fraction that divides the total combustible
mass loading into different types, or categories, i (refer to
Tables 8 and 9). Qi is the fraction of a fuel type that is as-
sumed to burn following nuclear ignition, and Si is the mean
elemental carbon emission factor for that fuel type (Tables 8
and 9). To adjust the estimated smoke emissions for national
differences in fuel characteristics, a parameter, Ci , is also
specified as the ratio of the fuel type per person in the city in
question to the fuel type per person in the developed world
in 1980. Finally, to account for smoke removal in “black
rains” induced by firestorms, the average fraction of emitted
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Table 8. Fuel parameters for developed world circa 1980 (Turco et al., 1990).
Material Fuel Mass, Tga Fraction of mass Elemental carbon F*R*S*C*Qc
in a given category, F emission factor, Sb
Wood/lumber 9450±3150 0.83 0.01 (0.002–0.02) 0.0066
Primary and secondary 1190±310 0.10 0.06 (0.03–0.10) 0.0048
petroleum products
Plastics and polymers 430±30 0.04 0.08 (0.05–0.10) 0.0026
Asphalt roofing 375±125 0.03 0.1 (0.06–0.13) 0.0024
a Mass in the developed world circa 1980, mid-value ± extremes.
b Typical value, range in parentheses.
c C,Q assumed to be unity, R=0.8.
Table 9. Fuel parameters for U.S. circa 1980 (Small, 1989).
Material Fuel Mass, Tg Fraction of mass Smoke emission F*R*S*C*Qa
in a given category, F factor, S
Wood 592 0.45 0.009 0.0032
Paper 71 0.05 0.005 0.0002
Plastics/Rubber 136 0.10 0.071 0.0057
Hydrocarbons 278 0.21 0.037 0.0062
Cloth 58 0.04 0.017 0.0005
Food (dry ) 13 0.01 0.013 0.0001
Asphalt 42 0.03 0.121 0.0029
Urban Open 132 0.10 0.012 0.001
a Assuming R=0.8, C and Q=1.
elemental carbon that is not scavenged in fire-induced con-
vective columns is specified by the parameter, R, which is
assigned a baseline value of 0.8 (see below).
Assuming for the moment that C and Q are unity, the
value of the bracketed term in Eq. (5) – based on the
data in Table 8 – is 0.016 g(soot)/g(fuel) (Turco et al.,
1990). Alternatively, using the data in Table 9, the value
is 0.020 g(smoke)/g(fuel) (Small, 1989). An important dif-
ference between these estimates is the fraction of fuel in the
category of wood and wood products. A more subtle dif-
ference is that Turco et al. (1990) estimate the mass of soot
generated by fires, while Small (1989) gives the total amount
of smoke, of which soot is a partial component. Comparing
specific absorptivities, or absorption cross-sections per unit
mass, in m2/g(smoke), we find that Turco et al. (1990) used
7 m2/g(soot) while Small (1989) assumed 4.4 m2/g(smoke).
These numbers are better normalized by converting specific
absorptivity to the absorption coefficient per unit mass of fuel
burned (that is, by combining the emission factor and specific
absorptivity), which yields a value of 1.1×10−1 m2/g(fuel)
for Turco et al. (1990), and 8.6×10−2 m2/g(fuel) for Small
(1989). These two values are in very reasonable agreement.
In subsequent paragraphs, we discuss alternative values for
Mf and C.
To scale fuel loading from population density, we em-
ploy a linear relationship that is represented by the solid
line in Fig. 9. This relationship corresponds to the base-
line fuel mass per person, Mf =1.1×107 g/person, being dis-
tributed over an area of 1 km2 (1010 cm2), yielding a slope
of 0.0011 g/cm2 per person/km2. Figure 9 also compares
this baseline model with several other estimates of fuel bur-
dens relative to population density. Bush et al. (1991) stud-
ied specific area-averaged fuel loadings in 6 regions of the
U.S. based on urban land-use patterns, assigning fuel load-
ings according to standard land-use categories. Bush et
al. (1991) also provided data on the urban population den-
sity in each of these areas. We assumed that these urban
population densities applied to the roughly 50% smaller ur-
ban areas they used to determine fuel loadings. Their re-
sults are indicated by the yellow symbols in Fig. 9. After
calibrating against population, we carried out a linear re-
gression for the fuel loading versus population density data
points. The regression yielded a zero-population fuel load-
ing of about 0.8 g/cm2, which is roughly consistent with the
background urban and residential vegetation fuels assumed
by Bush et al. (1991). Because of this mean background
fuel component, the average fuel loadings derived by Bush
et al. (1991) are higher (by about 40–60%) at the lowest
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Fig. 9. Information relating areal fuel loading, FL, to population density, P , is summarized. Data points are based on land-use studies
for a number of cities: San Jose, Simonett et al. (1998); Hamburg, OTA (1979); Hamburg, Ebert (1963); Hamburg, Pittock et al. (1985);
U.S., Bush et al. (1991). The solid black line corresponds to a linear relationship, FL∝P , or 1 lnFL=1 lnP , with no background (zero
population) contribution to the fuel loading. The dashed curve is an extrapolation of a linear regression derived using data published by Bush
et al. (1991); in this case, a background fuel loading associated with urban/rural vegetation was included, which leads to the curvature seen
at low fuel loadings.
population densities than the baseline model in Fig. 9. Even
so, background vegetation has been ignored in the present
analysis in favor of the linear model in Fig. 9. Also shown
as a dashed line in Fig. 9 is the extrapolated regression corre-
sponding to the data of Bush et al. (1991), which exhibits cur-
vature at low population densities owing to the background
fuel contribution. Significantly, the two fuel loading mod-
els extrapolate to very similar values (within ±10%) at the
higher population densities typical of megacity centers.
For the cases considered by Bush et al. (1991) the mean
fuel loadings are relatively low. This can be explained in
large part by the fact that Bush et al. (1991) sought to es-
timate the average fuel loadings that would apply to large
yield nuclear weapon detonations over typical, moderate-
sized U.S. cities, such as Nashville, Tennessee. The foot-
print of a large weapon encompasses areas far removed from
a city center. Hence, on an area-weighted basis, the average
fuel loading is likely to be dominated by low values in un-
inhabited areas around cities, and in residential areas. Sim-
ilarly, low average population densities would be predicted
for target zones associated with high-yield detonations. For
example, a 150-kt explosion is capable of igniting an area
of 100 km2, which would likely include extensive suburban
tracts with low population densities, especially in smaller
U.S. cities. While both the mean population density and
fuel loading will be biased toward lower values in such cases,
the average per capita fuel loading might actually be higher,
even without background vegetation, because of the larger
square footage associated with residential property. Impor-
tantly, when Bush et al. (1991) considered higher density
housing districts, predicted fuel loadings were much greater,
reaching 9 g/cm2 in one area of Nashville, for example. This
points to the fact that smaller detonations aimed at urban cen-
ters should be expected to ignite much higher fuel densities
on average than larger yield weapons.
Simonett et al. (1998) analyzed components of the fuel
load for San Jose, California. They documented the numbers
and types of buildings, and used literature-derived fuel loads
for each building type to deduce an average fuel loading of
0.94 g/cm2 within the city boundaries. The analysis omit-
ted various types of fuels, such as stored petroleum and as-
phalt in roofing, but estimated that the total fuel load might be
1.34 g/cm2. Using the 1980 San Jose population of 629 246,
and a city area of 440 km2, we obtain a population density
of 1370 people/km2 at the time. The average San Jose fuel
loading then falls slightly below the baseline curve in Fig. 9.
Several investigators have determined fuel loads for the
portions of Hamburg that experienced firestorms during
World War II (Fig. 9). The population density in the burned
sections of Hamburg was roughly 20 000 people/km2 (Lucas
et al., 1990). Ebert (1963) cites fuel estimates by German
fire engineers of 32 g/cm2 of wood in one area of the city
center. The SCOPE assessment (Pittock et al., 1985) cites
the fuel loading in Hamburg as 47 g/cm2, while OTA (1979)
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gives 16 g/cm2, although neither source is clear on the ori-
gins of these values. Schubert (1969) carefully investigated
the wood loading in two sections of Hamburg with areas of
0.37 km2 and 0.45 km2, finding values of 16 and 12 g/cm2,
respectively. Peczkis (1988) described Dresden’s city center
in WW-II as being dominated by 5-story residences covering
a significant fraction of the land area; combustible loadings
for such buildings were used to estimate an average fuel bur-
den of 22 g/cm2. This value is likely to be low since it omits
the large amounts of coal stored in the city. A population
density was not given.
Similar fuel studies based on land use have not been car-
ried out for the dense inner regions of modern cities. Three
types of characteristic American cities circa 1980 were hy-
pothesized by Larsen and Small (1982), leading to fuel bur-
den estimates within the inner 2-km-radius urban cores of 23,
41, and 63 g/cm2. In the annular region 2–6 km from the city
centers, the corresponding fuel densities were estimated as 7,
11, and 18 g/cm2, respectively. By contrast, the average fuel
load for 50 high population density U.S. urban targets that we
derive below using population density is 12 g/cm2 (Sect. 6.3).
These results provide support for the idea that high average
fuel densities are associated with nuclear detonation scenar-
ios in which small bursts are aimed at population centers.
The fuel loading per person in the developed world may be
greater than that in the developing world, so that the values
of C in Eq. (5) may be less than unity. We have found little
direct work on fuel loading in countries such as Iran, India
and Pakistan. Tall buildings in megacities are not likely to
be composed of wood. For example consider Tehran, a mod-
ern megacity with a population near 10 million. Tehran has
large museums, art centers, palaces and a modern subway
system. About 66% of the buildings are unreinforced ma-
sonry (which poses a great earthquake hazard), 27% are steel
construction, and 4% reinforced concrete (EMI, 2006). The
masonry buildings contain little wood in their construction
(Maheri, 2005). Similar structures in the U.S. include the
World Trade Center Buildings. These are estimated to have
contained a fuel loading, per floor, of 1.4 to 1.9 g/cm2 but the
average fuel loading could have been as large as 4.6 g/cm2
since it was an office building with possibly lots of paper
(Rehm et al., 2002). Kumar and Rao (2005) measured fuel
loads in Indian office buildings and found an average value
corresponding to 1.9 g/cm2, per floor, which is very similar
to values from Britain. Hence what data we have suggest
fuel loads in the office buildings in the developing world are
similar to those in the developed world, and that the fuel is in
building contents as opposed to building structures.
While we have found no specific detailed analysis of fuels
in megacities in developing countries, a variety of relevant
indirect data available for large urban areas worldwide has
been considered to assess the possible variance in C. Ta-
ble 10, for example, compares vehicle ownership per capita,
and solid waste created per person, in a variety of megacities
(Decker et al., 2000). It is plausible that vehicle usage is re-
lated to the quantity of petroleum stored and used in cities.
Excluding Los Angeles, these data indicate that megacities
in the developing world have on average about 0.38 times
as many vehicles as megacities in the developed world, with
considerable overlap in specific cases. Similarly, solid waste
generation may correlate with the abundances of paper, card-
board, plastics, and other combustible materials, including
certain foodstuffs, that are available in urban zones. Cities in
the developing world generate roughly half the solid waste
per capita as cities in the developed world, suggesting that,
on this basis the fuel loading may be correspondingly lower.
Using country-level data to derive fuel burdens per capita
may underestimate fuels in cities because urban populations
are likely to have more wealth, property, and infrastructure
resources than rural populations. This is especially true in
the developing world, where the fraction of total population
in urban areas is ∼40–60% as compared to 70–80% in the
developed world (as of 2000; Table 11), while urban growth
in the developing world is much faster. As a crude measure of
relative national economic activity and wealth, carbon diox-
ide emissions per capita (Marland et al., 2005) can be com-
pared for different regions of the world (Table 11). Adopt-
ing an average emission of 2 metric ton-Carbon/person for
the “developed” world, and assuming that fuel availability
is proportional to carbon emission, we estimate that relative
fuel per capita, or the factor C, could range from 0.10 to 0.75
in the developing countries listed in Table 11, with an aver-
age value of 0.33. Since CO2 emissions are dominated by
fossil fuel consumption, however, this probably represents
a significant underestimate of the relative total quantities of
combustibles in cities. Further, the more rural nature of pop-
ulations in developing nations also biases such an estimate of
C toward lower values.
Another potential measure of fuel loading, given in Ta-
ble 12, is human appropriation of net primary productivity
(HANPP) (Imhoff, 2004). This quantity represents the av-
erage amount of food, wood, paper and fiber consumed per
person. It includes, mainly, cellulosic materials that dom-
inate the fuel mass in the developed world (Tables 8, 9).
As pointed out by Imhoff (2004), the ratio of HANPP be-
tween the industrialized countries and the developing nations
is about 0.56. This value is comparable to other measures of
the parameter, C.
Considering the data in Tables 10–12 discussed above, we
conclude that the parameter, C – the ratio of the average fuel
loading per capita for urban dwellers in the developing world
to that in the developed world – may currently lie in the vicin-
ity of ∼0.5. We also note that the more plausible proxies for
combustible burdens indicate values of C larger than 0.5.
A secondary issue concerning the value of C is whether
the fuel loading distribution in Tables 8 and 9, or the mass
of fuel per person, Mf , has changed significantly since 1980
(the basis year for the present analysis). The population of
the developed world increased by about 12% between 1980
and 2000. At the same time, the carbon dioxide emitted
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Table 10. Data from cities related to fuel loads (Decker et al., 2000).
City Population Vehicles Solid waste C vehicles/C
Millions (1995) per person (kg/day/person ) solid wasteb
Developed World
London 7.3 0.370 2.4/
Los Angeles 12.4 0.645 3.2a 4.1/1.64
Moscow 9.2 0.072 0.5 0.46/0.25
New York 16.3 0.109 1.6a 0.7/0.82
Osaka 10.6 0.069 0.4/
Tokyo 26.8 0.164 2.5 1.05/1.3
Average Developed World 0.238 (0.156)c 1.95
Developing World
Beijing 12.4 0.025 0.16/
Bombay 15.1 0.039 0.5 0.25/0.25
Cairo 9.7 0.097 0.5 0.60/.25
Calcutta 11.7 0.043 0.28/
Delhi 9.9 0.168 1.2 1.1/0.62
Karachi 9 .9 0.066 0.4/
Shanghai 15.1 0.010 0.06/
Tehran 6.8 0.066 0.4/
Tianjin 10.7 0.027 1.6 0.17/0.82
Average Developing World 0.060 0.95 0.38/0.49
a Multiplied by 2 to account for urban area mismatch in population and waste.
b C values are based on assuming the developed world value is 0.156 vehicles per person or 1.950 kg of waste per day per person.
c Average in parentheses ignores Los Angeles.
Table 11. Carbon dioxide emissions as a measure of combustible material per capita.
Country CO2 emissions 2002/1980, % urban 2000/1980 Inferred Ce
metric ton- Carbon/person (United Nations
(Marland et al., 2005) Secretariat, 2006)
Developed world
Central Europec 2.03/2.40 1
Oceaniad 2.74/2.25 74 (71) 1.4
U.S. 5.52/5.48 77 (75)a 2.8
Western Europe 2.05/2.17 73 (69)b 1
Developing world
China 0.74/0.41 36 (20) 0.37
Egypt 0.59/0.28 54 (44) 0.3
India 0.32/0.14 41 (23) 0.16
Iran 1.50/ 0.81 64 (50) 0.75
Pakistan 0.2/0.1 33 (28) 0.1
Average developing world 0.33
a North America b Europe c includes former USSR d includes Japan e Assumes CO2 emissions for the Developed World is 2.0 metric
ton-C/person.
per person in developed countries has not changed signifi-
cantly (Table 11). The steady carbon dioxide emissions sug-
gest that the per capita inventory of stored fossil fuels has
remained relatively stable. By comparison, the volume of
sawn wood used per capita in the developed world declined
to about 78% of its 1980 value by 2000 (FAOSTAT, 2005).
This decline, however, was offset by a large increase in the
amount of plywood, pressboard, and similar building prod-
ucts in use. Accordingly, the overall per capita consump-
tion of such materials has changed by less than 10%. For
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Table 12. Human Appropriation of Net Primary Productivity
(HANPP) (Imhoff et al., 2004).
Location HANPP (metric ton-Carbon/yr )
Africa 2.08
East Asia 1.37
North America 5.40
South America 3.11
South Central Asia 1.21
Western Europe 2.86
the U.S., per capita utilization of wood products remained
approximately constant from 1960 to 1995 (Matos, 1998).
Turco (1986) predicted that plastics use in the developed
world would double by the year 2000. Indeed plastics con-
sumption per capita in the U.S. doubled between 1980 and
1995 (Matos, 1998). Doubling the plastics inventory in Ta-
ble 8 leads to an increase in the soot emission factor from
0.016 g (soot)/g (fuel) to 0.018 g (soot)/g (fuel), suggesting
that C could be increased by about 13% to correct for in-
creased plastics usage worldwide.
An issue that was widely discussed in previous work is
the extent of smoke rainout in fire-driven convective columns
(Pittock et al., 1985; Turco et al., 1990). Here, we adopt a
baseline value for the rainout parameter, R (the fraction of
the smoke emission not removed), of 0.8, following Turco
et al. (1990). This relatively high value for R implies ineffi-
cient removal of smoke in the pyrocumulus systems driven
by an urban fire. Observations of such convection asso-
ciated with forest fires are consistent with smoke particle
over-seeding of capping cumulus clouds, which severely in-
hibits induced precipitation. As a consequence, essentially
no smoke removal is observed in pyrocumulus plumes that
stabilize below about 5 km (Andreae et al., 2004). Accord-
ing to Andreae et al. (2001) in natural fires the ratio of in-
jected smoke aerosol larger than 0.1µm to enhanced carbon
monoxide concentrations is in the range 5–20 cm3/ppb near
the fires. Jost et al. (2004) found ratios ∼7 in smoke plumes
deep within the stratosphere over Florida that had originated
a few days earlier in Canadian fires, implying that the smoke
particles had not been significantly depleted during injection
into the stratosphere (or subsequent transport over thousands
of kilometers in the stratosphere). Such evidence is consis-
tent with the choice of R=0.8 for smoke removal in pyro-
convection.
Smoke might also be removed by rainfall after the smoke
has been dispersed and no longer is concentrated enough
to inhibit precipitation. Evidence suggests that this wet re-
moval is very efficient. For example, observations at alti-
tudes near 10 km of smoke plumes processed by deep trop-
ical convective systems remote from originating fires have
yielded smoke to CO ratios of about 1 cm3/ppb (Andreae et
al., 2001), suggesting extensive rainout of the aged accumu-
lation mode smoke aerosol. This efficient removal in the tro-
posphere is avoided in the studies of Robock et al. (2007) be-
cause solar heating quickly drives the smoke into the strato-
sphere where rainfall does not occur.
6.2 Altitudes of smoke columns
Smoke can be scavenged by rainfall, which declines rapidly
with altitude and essentially ceases above the tropopause. It
follows that the altitude of smoke injection and stabilization
plays an important role in determining the overall lifetime of
injected smoke material. There are two mechanisms control-
ling the altitude to which smoke will rise. The first is lofting
by pyro-convection occurring above large combustion zones.
A substantial observational and theoretical database is being
developed based on pyro-convection seen in forest fires and
convective simulations for intense heat sources. The second
lofting mechanism is solar heating of elevated smoke plumes.
Here, some observational evidence also indicates such loft-
ing in nature. In relation to the present work, Robock et
al. (2007) discuss indications of strong self-lofting in their
numerical simulations of large smoke plumes, and provide
information that illustrates the role of pyro-cumulus injec-
tion height on subsequent scavenging rates.
Following a nuclear explosion the nuclear fireball rises to
its peak altitude in a few minutes. For the 15 kt explosions
investigated here the nuclear fireball is expected to rise to
about 6 km as discussed previously (Glasstone and Dolan,
1977). However, the fires generated by the explosion take
several hours to fully develop. Hence the injection height of
the smoke is controlled by the energy release from the burn-
ing fuel not from the nuclear explosion. The energy released
in a fire initiated by a nuclear explosion is much greater than
that released by the explosion itself. About 39% of the yield
energy of a nuclear explosion is converted to heat, which can
contribute to the lofting of the fireball. Hence a 15 kt ex-
plosion releases about 2.4×1013 J of thermal energy. In Hi-
roshima, about 13 km2 of fuel was ignited by the 15 kt ex-
plosion (Isikawa and Swain, 1981). Assuming a fuel load-
ing of 16 g/cm2 with an energy content of air-dried wood
(15×103 J/g), the energy release from the Hiroshima fires
would have been about 3×1016 J. This is more than 1000
times greater than the energy release from the atomic ex-
plosion. Not only is the energy output by combustion much
greater than from the detonation itself, the energy is released
over a period of several hours, leading to efficient convective
pumping.
The nuclear explosion at Hiroshima occurred at about
08:15 a.m. local time. According to Isakawa and Swain
(1981) it took about 30 min for the fires to become
widespread. A violent mass fire (sometimes called a
firestorm) with strong winds occurred from 11:00 a.m. to
03:00 p.m. The winds calmed at around 05:00 p.m. There-
fore, the fuel load was consumed over a period between 4
and 9 h. Assuming all the fuel was burned in 4 h the power
Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 1973–2002, 2007 www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/
O. B. Toon et al.: Consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts 1995
release would have been about 2×106 MW. Per unit area the
energy release rate was 1.7×105 W/m2, or about 130 times
the solar constant. Similar energy release rates have been
computed for the Hamburg mass fire and for simulated fires
in large cities attacked with nuclear weapons (Pittock et al.,
1985).
Forest fires can approach the same energy release as mass
fires. Westphal et al. (1991) investigated a very large Cana-
dian fire, which they estimated produced about 0.45 Tg of
smoke. The Canadian fire apparently consumed 95% of the
biomass, taken to be 1.5 g/cm2, over 720 km2 of forest dur-
ing a period of 24 h. The energy release rate was therefore
about 1.9×106 MW averaged over 24 h, which is compara-
ble to the Hiroshima energy release rate discussed above, al-
though spread over 50 times the area.
Much interest in plume rise was directed at the Kuwati
oil fires set by Iraqi forces in 1991. Small (1991) estimated
that oil well fires produce energy at a rate of about 300 MW.
Since the wells were separated by roughly 1 km, they repre-
sent a very small energy source relative to either forest fires
or mass fires such as occurred in Hiroshima. Hence these oil
well smoke plumes would be expected to be confined to the
boundary layer, and indeed were observed within the bound-
ary layer during the Persian Gulf War.
There have been numerous observations of elevated smoke
plumes from large fires. For example, the Canadian fire
plume discussed by Westphal and Toon (1991) was estimated
to have a top near 5 km. A similar Canadian smoke plume
was studied by Colarco et al. (2004) who estimated that the
original smoke plume penetrated to heights as great as 6 km.
Studies by Fromm and Servranckx (2003) show that intense
forest fires, in conjunction with deep convection can place
smoke deep into the stratosphere. Lavoue´ et al. (2000) deter-
mined a linear relationship between frontal fire intensity, and
height of the smoke injection based on forest fire data. For
intense crowning fires in Canada they suggest that the in-
jections typically reach an altitude near the tropopause, with
an average local injection height of 7.7 km. There are also
limited observations of smoke plume heights following mass
fires. The Hamburg convective cloud was estimated to have
a top near 9 km (Ebert, 1963).
While these data suggest that smoke plumes above intense
fires can rise to high altitude, they do not address the issue
of whether specific meteorological conditions are necessary.
Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et al. (2006) numerically
investigated the plume rise from a fire in Alberta, Canada
near Chisholm during 2001 that placed smoke directly into
the lower stratosphere. The Chisholm fire line was estimated
to be about 25 km long, and about 0.5 km wide. As is typi-
cal of forest fires, but not nuclear mass fires of the sort ex-
pected in urban areas, the fire line propagated, in this case
at a velocity near 1.5 m/s. Trentmann et al. (2006) and Lud-
erer et al. (2006) show that the pyro-convection at Chisholm
was driven by instability in the atmosphere and depended on
special meteorological circumstances. However, their sim-
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Fig. 10. Smoke plume heights from forest fires versus the fire line
intensity. The red and yellow boxes and the blue and red x’s are
the Kruger, Internation Crown Fire, Bor Forest and Red Lake fires
studied by Lavoue´ et al. (2000). The red circles are the computa-
tions from Luderer et al. (2006). A logarithmic fit to the data is
shown by the solid line, whose equation is given on the figure.
ulations suggest that the plume rise is not sensitive to the
amount of moisture in the fuel, nor to the presence of large
numbers of aerosols in the plumes.
Figure 10 combines the plume rise data from Lavoue´ et
al. (2000) with the calculations of Trentmann et al. (2006)
and Luderer et al. (2006) for varying energy release rates.
The calculations of Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et
al. (2006) suggest that the linear relationship between height
and fire line intensity suggested by Lavoue et al. (2000)
breaks down near the tropopause. Forest fires may have a dif-
ficult time moving smoke deep into the stratosphere via pyro-
convection. The midlatitude lower stratosphere has potential
temperatures that allow air to be transported horizontally into
the equatorial troposphere so material injected into the lower
stratosphere tends to be removed within a few months. How-
ever, material injected above about 18 km has potential tem-
peratures that are high enough to cause material to remain
inside the stratosphere at all latitudes, and thus have a much
longer residence time. Observations clearly show that forest
fire smoke does quickly reach the deep stratosphere where it
will have a long residence time (Jost et al., 2004; Fromm and
Servranckx, 2003; Fromm et al., 2000).
Several numerical modeling studies have been conducted
to investigate the altitude of the rise of the smoke plume from
a mass fire (Fig. 11). Penner et al. (1986) simulated fires of
several physical sizes and energy release rates. They com-
pared models and simulations for the Hamburg fire, which
suggested a plume peak altitude just above the fire of 12 km,
and downwind of 8 km, in agreement with the limited obser-
vations available (Fig. 11). Small and Heikes (1988) studied
nuclear generated mass fires of radii larger than 5 km. The at-
mospheres considered had stable lapse rates throughout the
troposphere. The simulated smoke plumes for the more in-
tense fires had tops well into the stratosphere, though the
bases of the smoke plumes were near 4 km. Small and Heikes
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Fig. 11. Heights of plumes from mass fires with varying radius,
compared with the heights from a forest fire as a function of area
intensity.
found that for these large fires the smoke plume height was
not sensitive to the area of the fire, and was mainly a function
of the rate of energy release per unit area. Penner et al. (1986)
had also carried out simulations for such large fires, assum-
ing a stable lapse rate, and found similar results as Small and
Heikes (refer to Fig. 11). By contrast, Heikes et al. (1990)
showed that for fires with radii below 500 m, the size of the
fire had a significant affect on the altitude of plume rise.
Penner et al. (1986) calculated similar plume rise heights as
Heikes et al. (1990) for 500 m radius fires (Fig. 11).
The maximum plume rise altitudes for mass fires stud-
ied by Penner et al. (1986), Small and Heikes (1988) and
Heikes et al. (1990) are compared with the simulations of the
Chisholm fire by Luderer et al. (2006) in Fig. 11. For the
Chisholm fire, we converted the line intensity into an equiv-
alent areal intensity by dividing by the width of the fire line,
which was taken to be 500 m. The comparison suggests,
following Heikes et al. (1990), that the fire radius plays an
important role in the altitude reached by the smoke plume.
For fires whose diameters exceed an atmospheric scale height
(about 10 km), deep penetration of the tropopause and lower
stratosphere occurs by pyro-convection. On the other hand,
pyro-convection induced by fires with dimensions well below
an atmospheric scale height – such as line fires in forests, and
the Hamburg mass fire – place smoke primarily in the middle
and upper troposphere.
As illustrated by Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer
et al. (2006) large forest fires may inject smoke into the
lower stratosphere through pyro-convection. However, Jost
et al. (2004) and Fromm et al. (2000) observed smoke deep
within the stratosphere. Simulations using mesoscale mod-
els suggest that smoke from forest fires, which is detrained
from the pyro-convection, is able to rise further by motion
induced by solar heating of the smoke (G. Stenchikov, pri-
vate communication, 2006; E. J. Jensen, private communica-
tion, 2006). Robock et al. (2007), in an accompanying paper,
show that such lofting also occurs in global scale simulations
forced by the smoke from a regional nuclear conflict.
We conclude that mass fires in urban areas ignited by 15-kt
sized explosions are likely to have smoke plumes rising into
the upper troposphere, although the initial smoke plumes are
unlikely to penetrate the tropopause unless the fire radius ex-
ceeds several kilometers. Further numerical simulations of
mass fires of a few kilometers radius would be useful to bet-
ter understand the behavior of pyro-convection for fires of
this scale, and the dependence of plume rise on ambient me-
teorology. It should be noted that Figs. 10 and 11 refer to
the peak altitude of the smoke plume. As illustrated by Pen-
ner et al. (1986), and Small and Heikes (1988) among oth-
ers, smoke is detrained over a wide range of altitudes. Even
for fires with tops well into the stratosphere, a substantial
fraction of the smoke emissions are detrained in the tropo-
sphere. Once lofted into the upper troposphere, however,
further lofting of the smoke may occur due to solar heating
of the smoke plume itself. As a conservative estimate of the
initial smoke injection heights for the scenarios studied here,
and by Robock et al. (2007) we will assume as a baseline
case that smoke is uniformly injected within the 150–300 mb
layer in the upper troposphere, although higher and lower in-
jection layers are also considered.
6.3 Optical properties of soot particles
There are two basic approaches to determining the optical
properties of aerosols. In the first approach the aerosols are
assigned mass extinction and absorption coefficients. Usu-
ally this approach is employed in climate models that do not
consider an evolving size distribution. The alternative ap-
proach is to assign optical constants and a size distribution.
Then as the particle size evolves the aerosol optical prop-
erties can be computed interactively. Unfortunately, smoke
aerosols can have a wide range of properties, and they can
have complex shapes making it difficult to precisely deter-
mine their optical properties. Here we have estimated the
mass of elemental carbon (also referred to as light absorbing
carbon, soot, and black carbon) emitted by the fires. Most
treatments of atmospheric aerosols subdivide smoke into el-
emental carbon, which is assumed to be absorbing at visi-
ble wavelengths, and other components, which is meant to
represent materials in the smoke that do not absorb sunlight.
The elemental carbon has a greater impact on climate per
unit mass than the other components because it absorbs light
rather than simply scattering it, but the other materials can
also enhance the absorption by the elemental carbon. While
our analysis of emissions ignores the other components of
the smoke, they will augment the climate effects as outlined
below.
Because of the importance to the climate of biomass com-
bustion aerosols in the atmosphere there is a vast literature
on their properties. Bond and Bergstrom (2006) exhaus-
tively reviewed our understanding of the optical properties of
freshly emitted, uncoated, light absorbing carbon. They con-
clude that the mass absorption coefficient of freshly emitted
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light absorbing carbon at mid-visible wavelengths (550 nm)
is 7.5±1.2 m2/g. This value compares well with the 7 m2/g
value chosen by Turco et al. (2000), for elemental carbon
generated in nuclear conflicts. The single scattering albedo
of such light absorbing carbon is about 0.2–0.3 (Bond and
Bergstrom, 2006), due in part to the small particle sizes of
the carbon particles, which are typically smaller than 100 nm.
The refractive index of light absorbing carbon is estimated
to be about 1.95 for the real index and 0.79 for the imagi-
nary refractive index. These refractive index values may be
nearly independent of wavelength in the visible wavelength
range, which leads to a mass absorption coefficient for smoke
that declines linearly with the inverse wavelength from 0.4
to 1µm wavelength (e.g. Bergstrom et al., 2002). As dis-
cussed by Bond and Bergstrom (2006) the use of Mie theory
for spherical particles does not allow one to produce mass
absorption coefficients as high as 7.5 m2/g using reasonable
densities for carbon. Hence it is common for climate mod-
els to underestimate the mass absorption coefficient for fresh
carbon. Robock et al. (2007), for example, use a model that
produces a mass absorption coefficient of 6.2 m2/g.
While the optical properties of light absorbing carbon are
reasonably well constrained, it is more difficult to determine
how they evolve in the atmosphere, and how the optical prop-
erties are affected by the presence of other materials in the
smoke. There are essentially three ways in which the prop-
erties may evolve or be augmented by additional materials.
First, the light absorbing aerosols may be externally mixed
with other non-absorbing aerosols. In this case the extinc-
tion optical depth will be the sum of that from the two types
of particles, but the absorption optical depth will remain the
same. External mixtures may not be very common. Second,
the light absorbing aerosols may become coated with other
materials that do not themselves absorb visible light. It is
likely that soot will be coated by sulfates in the stratosphere.
Many aged tropospheric biomass combustion aerosols also
are coated with various organics, sulfates and other materi-
als. In the case of coatings the absorption by the aerosols can
be increased over that of pure carbon. Bond and Bergstrom
(2006) suggest that coatings typically increase the absorption
by about 50%. It has been shown that core/shell models (e.g.
Toon and Ackerman, 1981; and Ackerman and Toon, 1981)
can reproduce the optical properties of these coated materi-
als. Finally the light absorbing aerosols may coagulate with
other light absorbing aerosols to produce chains or sheets of
particles. Unlike the case for spheres, it is found that the op-
tical properties of sheets or chains do not vary greatly with
size (Nelson, 1989; Bond and Bergstrom, 2006). While the
mass absorption coefficient for particles smaller than about
0.1µm is similar for soot aggregates and spheres, for parti-
cles larger than 0.1µm it is much higher for aggregates. If
the aggregates collapse into more compact forms, perhaps
due to humidification, their absorption is reduced. In sum-
mary, if the newly emitted soot is coated with nonabsorbing
material, it will be much more absorbing than pure soot, and
Table 13. Estimated fatalities, and soot generation for 50 15-kt
detonations in urban zones.
Country Total Soot Generation
(Tg )
Average Fuel Loading
(g/cm2)
Argentina 1.41 13
Brazil 2.22 21
China 5.22 50
Egypt 2.63 25
France 1.05 10
India 3.67 35
Iran 2.4 23
Israel 0.85 8
Japan 1.92 19
Pakistan 2.9 28
Russia 1.89 18
UK 0.91 9
U.S. 1.2 12
will also have a higher extinction optical depth. If the soot in-
stead agglomerates into chains, its optical properties may not
change much over time due to coagulation, unless the chains
collapse.
There are many observations of biomass burning aerosols
in the atmosphere. Reid et al. (2004, 2005) review the opti-
cal properties and particle sizes of smoke in the atmosphere.
Generally it is found that the particles are near 0.1–0.2µm in
diameter and morphologically “semi-spherical/semi-liquid
droplets with complex cores.” The liquid components are of-
ten low vapor pressure organics that survive oxidation in the
flame. As the intensity of the fires increases, the liquid com-
ponents decline and the emissions are dominated by com-
plex chain aggregates. Clearly fires in an urban environment
following a nuclear explosion will have a range of combus-
tion intensities, but mass fires are likely to completely oxi-
dize the fuels that are readily available. A second element
of the smoke, but with lower mass fraction, is composed of
2–15µm diameter ash particles. Even pieces of dirt and non-
combustible material can be lofted by winds in the fire zone.
Because of the complexity of the fire environment, we
have not attempted to estimate the amount of material emit-
ted that is not elemental carbon. However any additional ma-
terial probably will make the climate forcings larger than in
the Robock et al. (2007) model. Added independent particles
will create a mixture with the same absorption optical depth
as pure carbon, but with a higher scattering optical depth.
Such a mixture will lead to a larger radiative impact on cli-
mate. A situation in which the transparent material coats the
carbon will lead to a larger absorption optical depth, probably
by about 50%, and also an increased extinction optical depth.
This case will also lead to more forcing. Finally if the black
carbon only coagulates with itself the forcing should remain
the same as without coagulation, except for the unlikely case
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that the chains collapse, but do not become coated with an-
other material.
6.4 Calculations of the smoke emissions in a regional con-
flict
We use the LandScan (2003) population density database as
a fuel-loading database by summing the product of P and
Mf over a fire zone. The fuel loadings summarized in Ta-
ble 13 represent averages over the fire zones in 50 target areas
in various countries as an example of typical fuel loadings.
For a 15-kt explosion, we assume the fire zone area is equal
to that of the Hiroshima firestorm – 13 km2 – ignited by a
weapon of about the same yield. The fuel loadings in Ta-
ble 13 are comparable to those derived for U.S. urban cores,
and old European cities at the time of WW-II as discussed
above, and summarized in Fig. 9.
Using Eq. (5) we calculated the elemental carbon emitted
in each target area in a number of different countries. In each
case for Eq. (5) we used LandScan for P, assumed A was
13 km2, assumed Mf was 1.1×107 g fuel/person, that R was
0.8, that C and Q were each unity, and that the sum of FS
is 0.016 g soot/g fuel. Figure 12 shows that different coun-
tries have different smoke emissions, and within a country
the emissions differ between targets. These differences are
due to variations in population density and hence fuel load-
ing. The analysis, summarized in Table 13, suggests that
an attack on a single country with 50 15-kt weapons might
produce from slightly less than 1 Tg to more than 5 Tg of
black carbonaceous smoke, after allowing for prompt rain-
out. Most of this “soot” would reside in the middle and upper
troposphere or above, where it may be subject to further loft-
ing (Pittock et al., 1985; Robock et al., 2007). It is possible
that fuel loading in developing countries is lower than in de-
veloped countries; although not applied in deriving Table 13,
a factor of 0.33–0.5 was estimated in Sect. 6.1.
Based on our analysis, U.S. urban centers targeted by 50
15-kt weapons would generate about 1.2 Tg of elemental car-
bon. Small (1989) predicted that 37 Tg of smoke would be
emitted in a full scale nuclear war involving 3000 Mt of yield
detonated on 4300 targets (about 1700 of which were rural
military targets), including about 50% of the U.S. urban and
suburban area. The smoke production in our scenario scales
almost linearly with the number of explosions in urban areas.
However, the amount of smoke per kt of yield is 100 times
greater for small yield weapons than for large yield weapons
because fuel loading in city centers is much higher than the
average over urban-suburban fuel complexes. In scenarios
with large numbers of high yield weapons, many detonations
either overlap or impact sparsely populated regions with very
low fuel loadings.
As we discussed above there have been numerous cases
in which stratospheric smoke has been observed following
large forest fires. These observations rely on modern high
altitude aircraft and satellites, which were not available dur-
ing WWII. There were several mass fires during WWII. The
best known of these were in Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the Dresden, Tokyo, Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki fires occurred within a few months of
each other in 1945, the Hamburg mass fire occurred in 1943.
These five fires potentially placed 5% as much smoke into
the stratosphere as our hypothetical nuclear fires. The opti-
cal depth resulting from placing 5 Tg of soot into the global
stratosphere is about 0.07, which would be easily observable
even with techniques available in WWII. However 5% of that
optical depth is only 3.5×10−3, which would not have been
possible to observe, either remotely or by in situ techniques,
at that time.
There are many uncertainties in these estimated smoke
emissions. We have assumed that all the fuel in the region
that is attacked burns (Q=1), and that very little is removed
in induced convection (R=0.8), both of these assumptions are
upper limits. While the average fuel per person, Mf , that
we use is within 10% between different studies, we have as-
sumed that people who live in dense urban areas have the
same average as those in less developed regions. Choosing
the 50 most densely populated regions in the U.S., for exam-
ple, we deduce an average fuel load of 12 g/cm2, while Lar-
son and Small (1982) deduced that the fuel load in the centers
of dense American cities might be 63 g/cm2. There is clearly
additional work that is needed to obtain more accurate esti-
mates of the quantities of combustible materials in modern
megacities, particularly in the developing world. Studies of
intense forest fires indicate that the smoke from fires due to
low yield nuclear weapon explosions will be injected largely
into the upper troposphere. However, numerical modeling
for fires of the sizes involved here would be useful, as would
additional studies of natural fires. Compared with other un-
certainties in the scenarios considered in the present study,
such as the sizes and numbers of weapons used in a possible
“small” nuclear conflict, the fuel loading, and smoke emitted
are not likely to be the dominant sources of uncertainty in the
environmental outcomes.
7 Impacts on atmospheric chemistry
The combustion of 63 to 313 Tg of fuel will lead to the emis-
sion of 1–5 Tg of soot, about 13 Tg of CO (or ∼1% of the
global annual source), and about 0.25 Tg of NO (some tens
of percent of the annual stratospheric source of NOx) based
on the emission values in Pittock et al. (1985). Large quanti-
ties of pyrotoxins will be emitted, particularly CO, and near
the fires these will be hazardous (Postol et al., 1986). How-
ever, serious global or regional scale impacts related to these
gaseous emissions seem unlikely.
Stratospheric ozone loss has previously been predicted
to follow the use of large numbers of high yield nuclear
weapons primarily in relation to NO injected by rising fire-
balls. In the present case NO production is not large enough
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Fig. 12. Estimated carbonaceous smoke emissions per target for each of 50 targets. Smoke emissions vary between different targets because
of different population densities.
to cause significant depletion of ozone. However, strato-
spheric soot injections, as projected here, might lead to sub-
stantial ozone perturbations. First, radiative heating by soot
deposited in the upper troposphere would force ozone-poor
air to rise into the stratosphere, displacing ozone-rich air
(Kao et al., 1990; Robock et al., 2007). In addition, soot
reaching the stratosphere would cause strong local heating of
the stratosphere, which in turn would alter chemical reaction
rates and further perturb stratospheric dynamics. In previous
simulations of large-scale nuclear smoke clouds (Kao et al.,
1990), such interactive effects reduced total ozone by 50% at
some Northern Hemisphere locations, while increasing it by
a similar amount at places in the Southern Hemisphere, all
within 20 days of the detonations.
Soot, like other stratospheric particles, may also catalyze
chemical reactions involving key species such as HCl, lead-
ing to accelerated ozone loss. At one time it was thought that
carbonaceous aerosol might be consumed by reactions with
ozone (Stephens et al., 1989) and other oxidants, reducing
the lifetime of soot at stratospheric altitudes. However re-
cent data shows that the reaction probability for such loss of
soot is about 10−11, so it is not an important process on times
scales of several years (Kamm et al., 2004).A full simulation
of stratospheric chemistry, along with additional laboratory
studies, would be needed to evaluate the importance of these
processes. It should be noted that rate constants for a number
of potentially important reactions are lacking. Nevertheless,
all the known reactions suggest that the stratospheric ozone
would be lost, not gained, so that substantial stratospheric
ozone depletion is a likely outcome of the scenarios studied
here.
8 Conclusions
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the
world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with popula-
tions exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, ad-
vanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such
small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane
or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a sin-
gle detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fa-
talities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties
exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still ex-
ist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least
six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons invento-
ries. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear
explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involv-
ing 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential
to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War.
Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air
burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the
entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades
owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamina-
tion. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana sug-
gests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear
catastrophe would most likely have severe national and inter-
national economic consequences. Striking effects result even
from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield det-
onations are most effective against city centers where busi-
ness and social activity as well as population are concen-
trated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely
to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the
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U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such
a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once
predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in
a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities
of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton
of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate
perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not ex-
tend our casualty and damage predictions to include poten-
tial medical, social or economic impacts following the initial
explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past
for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchin-
son, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the
present scenarios and physical outcomes.
There are many uncertainties in the analysis presented
here. Some of them can be reduced relatively easily. For in-
stance, surveys of fuel loading in developing nations would
reduce the uncertainty in the amount of smoke produced by
urban fires. Numerical modeling of urban mass fires, would
reduce the uncertainty in smoke plume heights. Investiga-
tions of smoke removal in pyro-cumulus would reduce the
uncertainty in smoke injections. The major uncertainties,
however, are likely in our choices of scenario. We have con-
sidered only the casualties in urban zones, and we have as-
sumed they would be attacked on the basis of population.
Instead, one might target as many cities as possible irrespec-
tive of population in order to spread the damage, or target
those with important economic assets. Military targets likely
would also be to be attacked, but we have not included them
in our analysis. However, we have also used a very small
number of low yield weapons within the range of those con-
trolled by the smallest current nuclear states. Larger numbers
of weapons, and larger yield weapons, are possible. Many
scenarios can be constructed, some of which will lead to
fewer casualties, less radioactivity and less smoke emitted.
The trivial example is that no effects will occur if no weapons
are used. Other scenarios will lead to more casualties, more
radioactivity and more smoke. Our example uses less than
0.1% of the yield of nuclear weapons that exist on the planet.
For instance, a war between China and India likely would
lead to more weapons of higher yield being used than as-
sumed here. The current build up of nuclear weapons in an
increasing number of states points to scenarios in the next
few decades that are more extreme than the one we consid-
ered. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analy-
sis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of
the scientific community, as well as widespread debate.
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